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Following the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom and the Conservative’s plans to replace the Human Rights Act with a British Bill of Rights, this article argues that this is an opportunity to re-open the debate on how best to address the current political stalemate on a Northern
Ireland Bill of Rights, an unfulfilled element of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. We argue
that at a time when there is so much uncertainty about the protection and safeguarding of rights
with a real risk of lesser rights for fewer people in the United Kingdom, more than ever is the need
to provide an alternative to progress the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights. This article provides that
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with a range of key players involved in the Northern Ireland process and point to the pressing need
for an alternative approach to a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland.
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Following the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom and the
Conservative’s plans to replace the Human Rights Act with a British
Bill of Rights, this article argues that this is an opportunity to re-open
the debate on how best to address the current political stalemate on a
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights, an unfulfilled element of the
Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. We argue that at a time when there
is so much uncertainty about the protection and safeguarding of
rights with a real risk of lesser rights for fewer people in the United
Kingdom, more than ever is the need to provide an alternative to
progress the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights. This article provides
that alternative. The article is supported in its conclusions by a series
of semi-structured interviews with a range of key players involved in
the Northern Ireland process and point to the pressing need for an
alternative approach to a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland.
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"If somebody has proposals . . . let us hear them. If they have a better
alternative, let us hear it. Let us start . . . by trying to get a resolution
to the problems that have dogged our society."1
INTRODUCTION
Against the backdrop of the Conservative government’s plan to
replace the Human Rights Act 1998 with a British (UK) Bill of Rights
and now Brexit, this article aims to provide "a better alternative" to
the political stalemate on a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights that has
"dogged our society."2 The article focuses on ways forward for a
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights, and critically reflects on what Brexit
and the government’s proposals mean for such a Bill. Instead of
viewing these concerning and potentially far-reaching developments
with despair, this is an opportunity to re-invigorate the discussion
about progressing the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights.
The UK government’s decision to leave the European Union
following the narrow referendum outcome (48% voted to remain
against 52% who voted to leave) alongside its plans to replace the
Human Rights Act with a British Bill of Rights has raised serious
concerns in terms of human rights compliance with international
standards.3 It is pertinent to note at the outset that the European
* Dr. Anne Smith is a lecturer, Transitional Justice Institute/School of Law, Ulster
University. Monica McWilliams is Professor of Women’s Studies at the Transitional Justice
Institute/School of Criminology, Politics and Social Policy. She was also the Chief
Commissioner of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commissioner from 2005 to 2011. This
article was written in a personal capacity only. Priyamvada Yarnell is a PhD candidate at the
Transitional Justice Institute. The research has been supported by funding from the Joseph
Rowntree Charitable Trust. We are grateful to Colin Harvey and Rory O’Connell for
comments on earlier drafts. A draft of this article was presented at a Workshop on Local,
Regional, and International Perspectives on Political Settlement at the International Institute
for the Sociology of Law in Oñati, Spain, July 14-15, 2016. All errors are solely the authors’
responsibility.
1. Peter Robinson, former First Minister, Address at Northern Ireland Assembly, Private
Members’ Business (July 16, 2013), http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/assembly-business/
official-report/reports-12-13/16-july-2013/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2016).
2. Id.
3. THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UK: CHANGING
BRITAIN’S HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (Oct. 2014), https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/files/
downloadable%20files/human_rights.pdf; HM Government, The Process of Withdrawing from
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Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) is a regional legal
instrument established by the Council of Europe and enforced by the
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. This distinguishes it
from EU law, which is enforced by the European Court of Justice in
Luxembourg. However, the two instruments are interlinked. The case
has also been made that withdrawal from the ECHR would jeopardize
a State’s EU membership4 since ratification of the ECHR is a
condition for entry. Despite the extensive scholarly media
commentary on (a) the implications of Brexit; (b) the repeal of the
Human Rights Act; and (c) the possible withdrawal from the ECHR,5
there has been much less commentary on the implications of all three
for the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement’s proposal for a Bill of Rights
for Northern Ireland. This article addresses this gap by drawing upon
the empirical findings of a research project aimed at progressing the
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights.6 This empirical data resulted from
conducting twenty-one semi-structured interviews with the main
political parties in the Northern Ireland Assembly, representatives of
the UK and Irish governments, civil society, and key stakeholders
involved in the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights and archival research

the European Union (Feb. 2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/503908/54538_EU_Series_No2_Accessible.pdf.
4. See Vaughne Miller, Is Adherence to the European Convention on Human Rights a
Condition of European Union Membership?, House of Commons Library, Standard Note,
SN/IA/6577 (Mar. 25, 2014).
5. There has been a plethora of blogs on Brexit and a series of reports by the London
School of Economics European Institute. See LSE Commission on the Future of Britain in
Europe, LONDON SCH. ECON. EUR. INST. (Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstit
ute/LSE-Commission/LSE-Commission-on-the-Future-of-Britain-in-Europe.aspx (last visited
Aug. 9, 2016); see also Brian Gormally, Fighting the Repeal of the Human Rights Act, COMM.
ADMIN. JUSTICE (Jun. 2015), http://www.caj.org.uk/files/2015/11/11/Fighting_the_Repeal_
of_the_Human_Rights_Act(1)2.pdf; Colin R.G Murray, Aoife O’Donoghue & Ben T.C.
Warwick, Policy Paper: The lace of Northern Ireland within UK Human Rights Reform, (Aug.
2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2643464; Ed Bates, Christine Bell, Colm O’Cinneide, Fiona
de Londras, Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Sir David Edward, Alan Greene, Paul Johnson & Tobias
Lock, The Legal Implications of a Repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 and Withdrawal from
the European Convention on Human Rights (May 12, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2605487; Caoilfhionn Gallagher, Gavin Booth, Katie O’Byrne, Anurag Deb & Keina Yoshida,
Report on the Potential Effects of the Repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998, KRW L. &
DOUGHTY ST. CHAMBERS, (Feb. 2016), http://www.doughtystreet.co.uk/documents/uploadeddocuments/HRA_NI_FINAL_15_02_16.pdf.
6. See Anne Smith, Monica McWilliams & Priyamvada Yarnell, Political Capacity
Building: Advancing a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, TRANSITIONAL JUST. INST. (2014),
https://www.ulster.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/58271/Advancing_a_BOR_NI.pdf.
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on the issue. Based on the empirical data, this article puts forward
proposals on how best to progress the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights
set against the current UK government’s proposals to replace the
Human Rights Act with a British Bill of Rights, as well as Brexit. In
doing so, this article makes a significant and original contribution on
several levels: it provides material arguing for the advancement of a
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights and offers a way forward by
identifying the issues needing to be addressed by the British and Irish
governments. It also proposes a policy framework that could lead to
greater coherence in the British and Irish governments’ approach to a
Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland.7 Finally, the article has broader
resonance for scholarly literature and work on "doing human rights"
in "ethno-nationally"8 divided societies and may be of wider
theoretical interest for explaining the intricate relationship between
the protection of human rights reform in the United Kingdom and the
devolution settlements.
The article is structured as follows: we begin by briefly
explaining the particular Northern Ireland context as it shows the
importance of the rights discourse in "deeply divided societies."9 We
then set out the various political agreements as well as a range of
government declarations and consultations on a Northern Ireland Bill
of Rights committing the UK government to bring forward legislation
on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. In particular, we focus on the
1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement,10 the 2003 Joint Declaration at

7. Note that other academics have also set out options for the way forward in Northern
Ireland. See Brice Dickson & Colin Harvey, A Discussion Paper: Enhancing the protection of
human rights and equality in Northern Ireland: Options for the Way Forward (July 2013) (on
file with authors). One of the solutions is to legislate for a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland.
The other two proposals are: to “do nothing” and “work with what you have got” for now; and
the other calls for a new Human Rights and Equality Bill for Northern Ireland enacted by the
Northern Ireland Executive.
8. Colin Harvey, Designing a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, 60(2) N.I.L.Q 181
(2009).
9. AREND LIPJHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE
EXPLORATION 5 (1980) at 5.
10. Agreement reached in the multi-party negotiations, Cm 3883 (1998) 37 ILM 751,
available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
136652/agreement.pdf [hereinafter Belfast/Good Friday Agreement]. The Agreement resulted
from the talks in Northern Ireland in 1998, which produced a blueprint for how future
relationships within and between the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland, and the United
Kingdom should be developed.
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Hillsborough,11 and the 2006 St Andrews Agreement,12 as these
explicitly set out the UK government’s intentions. This section
outlines that, despite these declarations, and despite being in receipt
of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s ("NIHRC")
advice since 2008,13 the current UK government has failed to
implement this part of the 1998 peace agreement. Although the
process began to stagnate under the Labour government in 2009, it
was increasingly undermined by the Conservative/Liberal Coalition
government in 2010. This was manifested most prominently in the
establishment of a Commission in March 2011 to explore the
possibility of a UK Bill of Rights and incorporating Northern Ireland
into this process. The findings of the UK Commission’s report are
examined in this section. We then draw upon our empirical findings
by analyzing the responses of the political parties, and examining the
role of the UK government in addressing the question of “what now”
for a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland.
The second half of the article discusses the disjointed approach
by the two governments (despite being co-guarantors of the 1998
Agreement) in addressing the issue of a Bill of Rights for Northern
Ireland. The UK government’s proposals to replace the Human Rights
Act of 1998 with a UK Bill of Rights and Brexit are discussed, as is
the issue of whether the consent of the devolved regions is required
for the introduction of a UK Bill of Rights and Brexit. Given that
some preliminary views for repealing the Human Rights Act were set
out in "Changing Britain: Human Rights in the UK" in 2014,14 this
document is used as a basis for our "what if" scenarios to help
investigate the implications of the government’s proposals for
Northern Ireland. The final section makes a series of
recommendations for the way forward for a Northern Ireland Bill of
Rights.

11. Joint Declaration by the British and Irish Governments, Gr. Brit.-Ir. Annex 3, ¶ 2,
Apr. 2003, http://uir.ulster.ac.uk/31714/1/Final_Draft,_NILQ.pdf.
12. Agreement at St Andrews 2006, Gr. Brit.-Ir., Annex B, Dec. 2006 (stating in part that
“We will establish a forum on a Bill of Rights and convene its inaugural meeting in December
2006”).
13. A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: Advice to the Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland, N. IR. HUM. RTS. COMM’N (Dec. 10, 2008), http://www.nihrc.org/uploads/pub
lications/bill-of-rights-for-northern-ireland-advice-to-secretary-state-2008.pdf.
14. See THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, supra note 2.
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I. PARTICULAR CONTEXT OF NORTHERN IRELAND
Northern Ireland’s political and legal history was dominated by
half a century of one-party rule that allowed Unionists to exercise
"hegemonic control in Northern Ireland,"15 to the detriment of the
Nationalist/Catholic minority. During the period from 1922 to 1972,
the minority suffered discrimination and inequality on grounds of
religion and political belief at the hands of the majority in areas of
public and private employment, housing, education and welfare,
policing, and emergency law.16 However, the Northern Ireland
conflict17 is not based on religion, but "rather one where religion acts
principally as the marker for two distinct ethno national identities."18
As McEvoy puts it, the conflict is about "two groups with allegiances
to two different national communities, Britain and Ireland, which
themselves have had a long history of conflict."19 Broadly speaking,
one community (the Protestants) would identify themselves as British,
preferring to stay within the United Kingdom, and are referred to as
"Unionists"; the other community (the Catholics) generally identify
themselves as Irish and are referred to as "Nationalists" or
"Republicans."20
15. BRENDAN O’LEARY & JOHN MCGARRY, THE POLITICS OF ANTAGONISM,
UNDERSTANDING NORTHERN IRELAND 110 (1990).
16. See Martin Melaugh, Disturbances in Northern Ireland Report of the Cameron
Commission Appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland, HER MAJESTY’S STATIONARY
OFF. (1969), available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/cameron.htm; DAVID J. SMITH &
GERARG CHAMBER, INEQUALITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1991); John Whyte, How Much
Discrimination Was There Under the Unionist Regime, 1921-68?, in CONTEMPORARY IRISH
STUDIES (Tom Gallagher & James O’Connell eds., 1983). See also MICHAEL FARRELL, THE
ORANGE STATE (2D ED. 1980); KEVIN BOYLE, TOM HADDEN & PADDY HILLYARD, LAW AND
STATE: THE CASE OF NORTHERN IRELAND (1975).
17. The Northern Ireland conflict is sometimes referred to as “The Troubles.” See, e.g.,
Jane Winter, Abuses and Activism: The Role of Human Rights in the Northern Ireland Conflict
and Peace Process, 1 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 1-8 (2013).
18. PAUL NOLAN, NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE MONITORING REPORT NUMBER ONE,
COMMUNITY REL. COUNCIL 19 (Feb. 2012), http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/
nipmr_2012-02.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2016).
19. JOANNE MCEVOY, THE POLITICS OF NORTHERN IRELAND 8 (2008).
20. The Good Friday Agreement – An Overview, DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS INST. (June
2013)
http://www.democraticprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/The-Good-FridayAgreement-An-Overview.pdf (last visited Apr. 29 2016). This report acknowledges, as do the
authors of this article, that there are exceptions to this generalization. See Turkey:
Comparative Study Visit to the Republic of Ireland Conflict, DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS INST.
55-65 (2012), http://www.democraticprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/DPI-IrelandComparative-Study-Visit-2012.pdf.
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As is now well-documented, Northern Ireland also has a history
of political violence by Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries.21 This
resulted in decades of sectarian violence with a "complex
combination of a violent State reaction."22 During these decades of
civil and sectarian unrest, the discourse of human rights played a
prominent role with particular emphasis on the rule of law and
ensuring the government and state authorities were held accountable
for their "actions or inaction."23 This involved several, albeit
unsuccessful, attempts to introduce a Bill of Rights for Northern
Ireland.24 Some commentators believe that if earlier proposals on a
Bill of Rights had been passed by Northern Ireland’s Parliament,
much of the later conflict could have been avoided.25 Arguably,
"avoided" may be an overstatement, but had there been some form of
accountability mechanism (such as a Bill of Rights) ensuring good
governance and protecting everyone’s rights, the issue of
discriminatory practices would not have risen in the way they did.
In ethno-nationally divided societies such as Northern Ireland,
Bills of Rights play an important role. As is now generally
recognized, they "demarcate the power and discretion of the State";26
when it comes to making decisions relating to fundamental rights, it is
incumbent on elected politicians to do so in an equitable and fair
manner. If they fail to make decisions fairly, a Bill of Rights can help

21. For a brief chronological overview, see Martin Melaugh, Violence – Loyalist and
Republican Paramilitary Groups, CAIN WEB SERVICE (last visited Apr. 29, 2016),
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/paramilitary.htm.
22. Kieran McEvoy & John Morison, Constitutional and Institutional Dimensions
Beyond the “Constitutional Moment”: Law, Transition and Peacemaking in Northern Ireland,
26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 961, 970-95 (2003).
23. Winter, supra note 17, at 7.
24. Space constraints preclude a discussion on this issue. For a useful analysis, see
Smith, et. al., supra note 6, at Chapter 2.
25. MAURICE HAYES, MINORITY VERDICT: EXPERIENCE OF A CATHOLIC PUBLIC
SERVANT 81 (1995).
26. DAVID ERDOS, DELEGATING RIGHTS PROTECTION 3 (2010). Michele Lamb also
highlights the importance of the language of human rights in ethno-nationalist divided
societies in “providing the processual fairness needed to establish a dialogue that can lead
towards greater understanding between the two communities [Protestants and Catholics].”
Michele Lamb, Ethno-nationalist Conflict, Participation and Human Rights-based Solidarity
in Northern Ireland, 17 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 723, 729 (2013).
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the most vulnerable to hold their government to account.27 Placing
fundamental values and rights beyond government is particularly
important for post-conflict societies where parliamentary politics
leading to discriminatory practices has failed. In divided societies like
Northern Ireland where the governance of institutions created
"divisions and provoked resentment and alienation,"28 a Bill of Rights
is viewed as central to institutional reform.29 The break with the past,
embodied in transitions from violent conflict and one-party rule,
provides an opportunity to address issues not only of the rule of law
and good governance but other structural issues such as violations and
abuses against particular communities. It is in such a context that a
Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland is most needed. Technical
solutions will not be sufficient to address these challenges without a
foundational document setting out the principles and standards that
will command the allegiance of the people of Northern Ireland. A Bill
of Rights can therefore provide a constitutional point of reference that
becomes a legal framework for the politicians to act within. That is
what was envisaged in the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement of 1998.30
27. Asmal saw this role as government “being kept on its toes.” See Kader Asmal,
Address to Chatham House, London: Designing a Bill of Rights for a Diverse Society (Sept.
26, 2007) (on file with authors).
28. Brice Dickson, The Protection of Human Rights - Lessons from Northern Ireland, 3
EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 213, 214 (2000). Dickson draws upon Northern Ireland’s experience
of majoritarianism from 1921-1972, arguing that “it is the failure properly to protect human
rights in Northern Ireland that made the troubles of the past 30 years worse or so worse than
they might have been.” See also Aileen Kavanagh, The Role of a Bill of Rights in
Reconstructing Northern Ireland, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 964, 956 (2004). Additionally, see
Mageean and O’Brien’s article where they quote from O’Brien’s unpublished LLM thesis,
which highlights that in an analysis of speeches of the Irish government to the General
Assembly of the UN, every speech from 1969 until 1977, and from 1987 until 1991, the denial
of rights was mentioned as a contributing factor to the conflict. Paul Mageean & Martin
O’Brien, From the Margins to the Mainstream: Human Rights and the Good Friday
Agreement, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1499, 1504 (1999).
29. Monica McWilliams, Human Rights Underpins Devolution, THE GUARDIAN (Apr.
27, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2010/apr/27/human-ri
ghts-act-northern-ireland.
30. See Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, supra note 10. Following the ceasefires in the
mid-1990s multi-party peace talks began involving the British and Irish governments and the
Northern Ireland political parties. This resulted in the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, which
agreed on power-sharing arrangements for a new Northern Ireland Legislative Assembly.
These power-sharing arrangements reflect the ethno-national division in Northern Ireland and
have been described as having a “consociational” structure, involving institutionalized power
sharing arrangements between segments of society joined together by common citizenship but
divided by language, religion, ethnicity or other factors. See Brendan O’Leary, The Nature of

2016]

BREXIT, REPEAL OF HRA & N. IRELAND BOR

87

II. THE RECENT HISTORY OF A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR
NORTHERN IRELAND: NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS AND
DECLARATIONS
Under the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement31 and the Northern
Ireland Act, s.69 (7) 1998 ("NIA"), the NIHRC was tasked with
consulting and advising the British government on which rights
should be included in a proposed Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland.
The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement is an international peace
agreement between two sovereign States (Ireland and Britain) that
was signed and supported by the majority of Northern Ireland
political parties involved in the conflict.32 In addition, the Agreement
was overwhelmingly supported by a referendum in both Northern
Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland.33 As a bilateral agreement,
both the British and Irish government are its co-guarantors and, as an
international agreement, they are required to fulfill the obligations it
sets out through actions arising from it.34 These actions include the
2003 Joint Declaration at Hillsborough, which reiterated the UK
government’s commitment to bringing forward legislation on a Bill of
Rights for Northern Ireland at Westminster.35 This was followed by
the St Andrews Agreement of 2006 establishing the Bill of Rights
Forum made up of political parties and representatives from civil
society. Following its deliberations, the Forum presented its report to
the NIHRC36 and later that same year (December 10, 2008), the
NIHRC submitted its advice on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland
the Agreement, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1628, 1628-1667 (1999). The term
“consociationalism” was formulated by Lipjhart. See Lipjhart, supra note 9.
31. Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, supra note 10, at § 6 references the creation of the
NIHRC and a Bill of Rights.
32. The parties include Ulster Unionist Party ("UUP"), the Ulster Democratic Party
("UDP"), the Progressive Unionist Party ("PUP"), the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition,
the Alliance Party, Sinn Féin, and the Social Democratic and Labour Party ("SDLP"). The
Democratic Unionist Party ("DUP") did not sign up to the Agreement. See The Good Friday
Agreement – An Overview, supra note 20, at 34.
33. Id. 71.2% of people in Northern Ireland and 94.39% in the Republic supported the
Agreement.
34. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3), opened for signature May 23,
1969.
35. Joint Declaration by the British and Irish Governments, Gr. Brit.-Ir., April 2003,
Annex 3, ¶ 2.
36. Final Report: Recommendations to the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission
on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, BILL OF RIGHTS F. (Mar. 31, 2008), available at
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/law/bor/borf310308_report.pdf.
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to the British government.37 The Commission put forward its
recommendations for new substantive rights in addition to others
relating to enforcement and implementation. The recommendations
comprise a range of rights including economic, social, and cultural
rights as well as civil and political rights, incorporating the ECHR and
other international standards that reflect the particular circumstances
of Northern Ireland.38 In 2009, the Northern Ireland Office ("NIO")
responded to this advice by publishing its consultation document.39
The NIO selected certain sections of the NIHRC’s advice for
consultation and forwarded the view that further discussion on the
NIHRC’s advice could take place through a newly established UK
Commission on a possible UK-wide Bill of Rights. This Commission
was established by the Coalition government in 2011 and published
its report in December 2012.40 While the Commission could not reach

37. See A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: Advice to the Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland, supra note 13.
38. The recommendations include: the right to life, right to liberty and security, right to a
fair trial and no punishment without trial; right to marriage or civil partnership; right to
equality and prohibition of discrimination; democratic rights; education rights; freedom of
movement; freedom from violence, exploitation and harassment; right to identity and culture;
language rights; rights of victims; right to civil and administrative justice; right to health; right
to an adequate standard of living; right to accommodation; right to work; environmental rights;
social security rights; and children’s rights. Not all commissioners agreed with these
recommendations. Two commissioners (from unionist backgrounds) dissented: Lady Daphne
Trimble and Jonathan Bell dissented on the grounds that the inclusion of socio-economic
rights are not particular to Northern Ireland but “are by and large common societal problems
right across the UK.” Lady Trimble, House of Commons, Minutes of Evidence Taken before
the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland (July 1, 2009),
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmniaf/uc360-ii/uc36002.htm.
Political parties are also divided on this issue. On the one hand, political unionists argue that
the NIHRC exceeded its remit by including rights that do not reflect “the particular
circumstances of Northern Ireland” – a phrase that “do[es] not open the door to economic,
social and cultural rights.” Miss Mcllveen, Northern Ireland Assembly, Private Members’
Business on the NIHRC (Nov. 3, 2009), http://archive.niassembly.gov.uk/ record/
hansard_session2009.htm (last visited May 2, 2016). On the other hand, the SDLP, Sinn Féin
and Alliance Party, alongside NGOs, community groups, trade unions, and other civil society
organisations, argue that socio-economic rights must be included, as they do reflect the
“particular circumstances of Northern Ireland.” Smith et. al, supra note 6, at 32-33.
39. A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND: NEXT STEPS, N. IR. OFF. (Nov. 2009),
http://www.nio.gov.uk/consultation_paper__a_bill_of_rights_for_northern_ireland__next_step
s.pdf
40. COMMISSION ON A BILL OF RIGHTS, A UK BILL OF RIGHTS? THE CHOICE BEFORE
US vol. 1 (Dec. 2012)
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consensus on the need for a UK Bill of Rights,41 it did agree that it
should reject the government’s proposal that a separate chapter in any
future Bill could deal with the rights specific to Northern Ireland. In
addition, the Commission specified that any UK Bill should not
interfere with an independent process in Northern Ireland as it was a
stand-alone issue, established under the peace agreement almost
fifteen years prior.42
The UK government had already concluded something similar.
In its consultation document in 2009 the government argued that,
given Northern Ireland’s history of division and conflict, there was a
need for a separate Bill of Rights.43 Despite acknowledging the
substantial differences amongst the Northern Ireland parties over its
contents, it did not dispute the need for Northern Ireland to have its
own Bill of Rights. It was not surprising then that this view was
further supported by the findings of the UK Commission on a Bill of
Rights as set out below.44
We [the Commission] recognise the distinctive Northern Ireland
Bill of Rights process and its importance to the peace process in
Northern Ireland. We do not wish to interfere in that process in
any way nor for any of the conclusions that we reach to be
interpreted or used in such a way as to interfere in, or delay, the
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights process.45

41. Two out of eight commissioners (Baroness Helena Kennedy QC and Professor
Philippe Sands QC) dissented from the majority findings. See generally Mark Elliott, A Damp
Squib in the Long Grass: The Report of the Commission on a Bill of Rights, 2 EUR. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 137 (2013). For an excellent analysis of this report, see Francesca Klug & Amy
Williams, The Choice Before Us? The Report of the Commission on a Bill of Rights, PUB. L.
459 (July 2013).
42. COMMISSION ON A BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 40 at 175, ¶ 12.4. This is in stark
contrast to the other findings in the report, a report that has been criticized as having
“limit[ing], inchoate proposals.” Elliot, supra note 41. See also Klug & Williams, supra note
41.
43. A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND: NEXT STEPS, supra note 39, at 7.
44. See also dissenting opinions presented by Baroness Helena Kennedy QC and
Professor Philip Sands: “It is impossible to speak of principle when the true purport is not
being addressed explicitly and would include, for some at least, a reduction of rights. We
consider that the moment is not ripe to start moving towards a UK Bill of Rights until the
parameters of such proposals are clearly set out. We note in this regard that our colleagues in
the majority have, in our view, failed to identify or declare any shortcomings in the Human
Rights Act.” COMMISSION ON A BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 40, at 222.
45. COMMISSION ON A BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 40, at 175, ¶ 12.4.
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What is surprising is that despite such strong views from the
Democratic Unionist Party ("DUP") who argue that a separate Bill of
Rights for Northern Ireland would "distance Northern Ireland from
the rest of the UK"46 and that a UK Bill of Rights would "recognise
and respect the diversity of the devolved arrangements across the
country,"47 neither the DUP (the largest party on the Unionist side in
Northern Ireland) or the Ulster Unionist Party ("UUP") responded to
the UK government’s invite to make a formal submission to the UK
Commission on a Bill of Rights on this issue.
The two main unionist parties’ stance is therefore at odds with
the UK Bill of Rights Commission’s findings. Indeed one of the
members of the UK Bill of Rights Commission specifically focused
on Northern Ireland and endorsed different rights for the devolved
regions in the UK.48 Speaight QC argued that there has been explicit
and formal recognition of the desirability of a distinct Northern
Ireland Bill of Rights49 and cautioned that if there was to be a UK Bill
of Rights, devolved legislatures should be able to legislate for specific
rights within their jurisdictions.50 He continued:
Consideration of future rights protection in the UK should take
account of the reality that Northern Ireland [. . .] will have [its]
own laws on rights and that these laws will not always match
either each other or the laws at national level.51

The Joint Committee on Human Rights also discussed the idea of
rights being "asymmetrical" at national and sub-national levels.52 The
UK government has also recognized that there is "no
incompatibility"53 with a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights and a

46. DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND: NEXT
STEPS – RESPONSE BY DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY 1 (Mar. 30, 2010).
47. Jeffrey Donaldson, Human Rights Act Has Failed Victims, DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST
PARTY (May 12, 2015), http://www.mydup.com/news/article/donaldson-human-rights-act-hasfailed-victims.
48. Anthony Speaight QC, Mechanisms of a UK Bill of Rights, in COMMISSION ON A
BILL OF RIGHTS, A UK BILL OF RIGHTS? THE CHOICE BEFORE US vol. 1 (Dec. 2012) at 243.
49 Id. See also COMMISSION ON A BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 40.
50. Speaight, supra note 48, at 247.
51. Id. at 247-48.
52. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR THE UK? TWENTYNINTH REPORT OF THE 2007 – 2008 SESSION ¶ 110, cited in Anthony Speaight QC, supra note
48, at 244-245.
53. A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND: NEXT STEPS, supra note 38.
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possible UK Bill of Rights.54 It continues to state that if a Northern
Ireland Bill of Rights was introduced, any developments in the wider
UK context should not "undermine"55 the rights provided in a
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights, and committed to bringing forward
legislation for a separate Northern Ireland Bill of Rights.56 This
"commitment" was reiterated in the House of Lord’s debate that also
restated the UK Bill of Rights Commission’s finding that the
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights is and should remain a separate
process from the UK Bill of Rights.57
The current government’s attempt to introduce a British Bill of
Rights that will limit human rights to "serious" rather than "trivial"58
cases could also be seen to contravene "the importance and
significance of the Belfast Agreement in determining our way
forward on human rights legislation."59 Despite this position, the
former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has caused some
confusion when she referred to the "Rights, Safeguards and Equality
of Opportunity" section of the Agreement as having a "degree of
ambiguity"60:
Although the text does not go as far as stating that there would
definitely be a Bill of Rights, the [A]greement certainly
contemplated that a Bill of Rights was potentially an important
part of the settlement.61

The former Secretary of State’s argument that the "Rights, Safeguards
and Equality of Opportunity" section of the Agreement had a "degree
of ambiguity" was rebuffed by a number of stakeholders in Northern
Ireland, including the former Chief Commissioner of the NIHRC,
who is also a former member of the UN Human Rights Committee:

54. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: DEVELOPING OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK LONDON, REPORT, (Mar. 2009) CM 7577.
55. A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND: NEXT STEPS, supra note 38.
56. Id.
57. 24 Parl Deb HL (6th ser.) (2011) col. 677 (UK).
58. THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, supra note 3.
59. Theresa Villiers, former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Oral evidence to the
Northern Ireland Affairs Committee on Responsibilities of the Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland, (Jul. 15, 2015) HC 322.
60. Theresa Villiers, former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Westminster Hall
(July 16, 2013) in 16 Parl Deb WH (6th ser.) (2013) col. 194 (UK).
61. See id.
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. . . the language [of the Agreement] is such that you would be a
very strange interpreter of the text not to recognise that there’s a
responsibility [on]... the United Kingdom government, which is
the sovereign (government) to work towards the consideration of
the adoption of the Bill of Rights.62

The centrality of the Bill of Rights to the peace process is also
supported by the fact that the "Rights, Safeguards and Equality of
Opportunity" section is only one among the many references to a
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights in the Belfast/Good Friday
Agreement.63 Indeed, one politician states, "at the heart of the Good
Friday Agreement is a rights-based approach."64 Northern Ireland’s
Bill of Rights was therefore "not a last minute bolt-on in the
agreement"; it was recognized by many parties as being "core to the
agreement"65 and has been central to the UK government’s plans in

62. Interview with Professor Michael O’Flaherty, former Chief Comm’r of the NIHRC,
in Belfast (Sept. 11, 2013).
63. Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, supra note 10, Strand One, Democratic Institutions
in Northern Ireland, Safeguards, at 5 (“There will be safeguards to ensure that all sections of
the community can participate and work together successfully in the operation of these
institutions and that all sections of the community are protected, including: . . . (b) the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland
supplementing it, which neither the Assembly nor public bodies can infringe, together with a
Human Rights Commission; (c) arrangements to provide that key decisions and legislation are
proofed to ensure that they do not infringe the ECHR and any Bill of Rights for Northern
Ireland”); Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, Apr. 10 1998, Operation of the Assembly, at 11
(“The Assembly may appoint a special Committee to examine and report on whether a
measure or proposal for legislation is in conformity with equality requirements, including the
ECHR/Bill of Rights”); Legislation, at 26 (“The Assembly will have authority to pass primary
legislation for Northern Ireland in devolved areas, subject to: (a) the ECHR and any Bill of
Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it which, if the courts found to be breached, would
render the relevant legislation null and void.”).
64. Alex Attwood MLA, 105(2) NIA Deb vol. 105, no. 2, p. 41 (June 1, 2015), available
at http://www.theyworkforyou.com/ni/?id=2015-06-01.6.1#g6.79 (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
Former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, described the Agreement
as “conspicuous by the centrality it gives to equality and human rights concerns.” Mary
Robinson, Speech at the Stormont Hotel: Equality and Human Rights - Their Role in Peace
Building (Dec. 2, 1998), quoted in Mageean & O’Brien, supra note 28, at 1499.
65. Stephen Farry, MLA, NIA Deb vol. 105, no. 2 (June 1, 2015), http://www.
theyworkforyou.com/ni/?id=2015-06-01.6.1#g6.79 (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). Talking about
the protection of human rights generally in the Agreement, Ní Aoláin makes a similar
argument: human rights protections were not simply parachuted into the Agreement, but have
consistently been offered as a partial means to unlock the conflict pattern itself. See Fionnuala
Ní Aoláin, Human Rights in Negotiating Peace Agreements, INT’L COUNCIL HUM. RTS. POL’Y
1 (2005).
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any determination on their "way forward on human rights
legislation."66
Despite recognition that the responsibility lies with the UK
government to pass legislation on Northern Ireland’s Bill of Rights,
language used by the former Secretary of State is contrary on this
point:
Looking ahead, if there were agreement on additional rights for
Northern Ireland, the Government would examine how best to
take things forward. We remain open to the suggestion that work
on this, including legislation, could be taken forward by the
Assembly.67

However, when a letter had been sent previously in September of
2011 to each of the political parties in Northern Ireland proposing the
Assembly be empowered to take forward work in this area,68 none of
the parties expressed an interest in doing so. When asked to check this
correspondence during interviews with all the main political parties, it
became apparent that no one had responded to the NIO’s request. A
number of parties expressed their concern at the proposal to devolve
the discussions, noting that parties consistently exercise an effective
veto in the Northern Ireland Assembly on issues perceived by either
side to be contentious, preventing issues such as this from being taken
forward.69 As the Alliance Party noted, "our system of government
66. For further information on “the notable for its extended references to human rights”
in the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement, see Colin Harvey, Bringing Humanity Home: A
Transformational Human Rights Culture for Northern Ireland?, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
TRANSITION: THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONTEXT 49-50 (Clare Dwyer & Anne-Marie
McAlinden eds., 2015) [hereinafter Bringing Humanity Home].
67. Theresa Villiers, former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Westminster Hall
(July 16, 2013) in 16 Parl Deb WH (6th ser.) (2013) col. 194 (UK).
68. Letter from Owen Patterson, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (2010 – 2012),
to the leaders of the Northern Ireland Political Parties, received by the Northern Ireland
Assembly, (Sept. 22, 2011) (on file with authors).
69. See NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY REPORT, OFFICIAL REPORT (2001-02), (2001),
http://archive.niassembly.gov.uk/record/reports/010925d.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). For
example, the petition of concern was used to block the introduction of the Welfare Reform Bill
in May 2015. See Welfare Reform: SDLP ‘Cannot Accommodate’ Welfare Proposals, BBC
NEWS (May 22, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-32853348. A petition of
concern has been described by the Northern Ireland Assembly as: “a notice signed by at least
30 members and presented to the Speaker signifying concern about any forthcoming matter on
which the Assembly is due to vote. The effects of a petition of concern are (a) that the vote on
the matter may not be held until at least the day after the petition has been presented and (b)
the vote will be on a cross-community basis, rather than simple majority.” PLENARY TERMS,
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provides vetoes for the largest parties on either side of the divide and
it’s always easier to veto change than to veto no change."70
Respondents also focused on the absence of consensus amongst
the two main parties in government on having this issue devolved to
the Northern Ireland Assembly. Similar to the leader of the Alliance
Party who argues "unless the largest party was in favour it could still
be blocked . . . decisions are those that are worked out by the DUP
and Sinn Féin at Executive level,"71 the Green Party also believes
"there is the politically sensitive stuff . . . that goes into the Office for
First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMdFM) and doesn’t
NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY (2016), http://aims.niassembly.gov.uk/plenary/terms.aspx
(last visited Mar. 10 2016). This was tabled in respect of a motion questioning whether the
NIHRC had gone beyond its remit under the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement regarding the
development of a Bill of Rights in the context of the development of a Bill of Rights. On
October 1, 2001, the following amendment was put forward: “[the NIHRC] has been hindered
in discharging its remit due to limits on its powers and resources but congratulates the
Commission on its substantial contributions to the debate on and in developing human rights in
Northern Ireland.” The Assembly was divided with the Nationalist parties voting yes (48) and
the Unionists parties voting no (39). See PETITION OF CONCERN: NORTHERN IRELAND HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMISSION, NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY (2016), http://archive.
niassembly.gov.uk/record/reports/011001e.htm#8 (last visited Apr. 12 2016). On April 8,
2008, a motion was put forward and supported by the majority that showed concern at the lack
of cross-community support for Bill of Rights Forum report. See PRIVATE MEMBERS’
BUSINESS: BILL OF RIGHTS AND NORTHERN IRELAND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION,
NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY (Apr. 8, 2008), http://archive.niassembly.gov.uk/record/
reports2007/080408.htm#4 (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). See also NORTHERN IRELAND
ASSEMBLY REPORT, OFFICIAL REPORT (2009-10): MEMBERS’ BUSINESS ON THE NIHRC,
NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY (Nov. 3, 2009). Another petition of concern was tabled on
November 2, 2009 on the following motion proposed by the Unionist party: “That this
Assembly considers the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s advice to the Secretary
of State ‘A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland’ incompatible with the provisions of the Belfast
Agreement; notes with concern that the proposals would undermine the democratic role and
authority of this Assembly and the Parliament of the United Kingdom; and urges the Secretary
of State not to implement the report’s recommendations.” The following amendment was then
proposed to the motion: “notes the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s advice to
the Secretary of State, ‘A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland,’ and calls on the Secretary of
State to publish the consultation document as soon as possible.” The Assembly was divided as
46 voted yes; 39 voted no. See PRIVATE MEMBERS’ BUSINESS: NORTHERN IRELAND HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMISSION, NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY (Nov. 3, 2009) http://
archive.niassembly.gov.uk/record/reports2009/091103.htm#a5 (last visited Apr. 12, 2016).
70. Interview with David Ford, MLA, Alliance Party, in Belfast (Nov. 25, 2013) (on file
with authors). There is also a basic point: the Bill of Rights should bind the Assembly. This
can be done by Westminster legislation but it is very difficult to see how this can be done
neatly by Assembly legislation. Thanks to Rory O’Connell for bringing this point to the
authors’ attention.
71. Id.
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come out."72 An example of this prevarication is the disagreement
over the introduction of a Single Equality Bill despite the introduction
of the Equality Act of 2010 for Great Britain, which has meant that
Northern Ireland is "out of step with the rest of the UK in terms of
equality protections."73
Labour MP Ivan Lewis, a former Shadow Spokesperson on
Northern Ireland, noted that although devolution requires that the
Executive take the lead:
. . . there has been no progress historically, in the peace process
at very difficult stages without the active engagement of the two
governments very much working together as one.74

This view holds much merit, since it is unlikely that the proposals
from the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement on policing and criminal
justice reform would have been taken forward by the devolved
Assembly. Given the lack of political consensus on these reforms, it is
incumbent for the UK government to take the legislation through
Westminster.75
For the UK government to argue that a process should be
established at the devolved level to resolve party political differences
over the Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland is extremely problematic.
This is exemplified by the process established by the First and Deputy
First Ministers in July 2013 to resolve issues of cultural expression,
including parades and protests, flags, symbols and emblems, and the
legacy of the past.76 An all-party group was established and
independently facilitated by US diplomat Richard Haass and Megan

72. Interview with Steven Agnew, MLA, Green Party, in Belfast (May 2, 2013) (on file
with authors).
73. Motion put forward by the Alliance Party on a call for a fresh consultation on a
Single Equality Bill for Northern Ireland, Official Report 16 March 2015, available at
http://aims.niassembly.gov.uk/officialreport/report.aspx?&eveDate=2015/03/16&docID=2280
45 (last visited May 2, 2016).
74. Interview with Ivan Lewis, former Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland,
speaking on ‘The View’ BBC, in London, U.K. (May 8, 2014), quoted in Smith, McWilliams
& Yarnell, supra note 6, at 45.
75. Westminster passed The Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000. (Gr. Brit.).
76. The formal negotiations are formally known as The Panel of Parties in the Northern
Ireland Executive on Parades and Protests; Flags, Symbols, Emblems and Related Matters;
and the Past, Terms of Reference (2013), available at http://panelofpartiesnie.com/terms/ (last
visited Nov. 8, 2016).
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O’Sullivan.77 The Haass-O’Sullivan negotiations took place between
the political parties from July to December of 2013 with stakeholders
from civil society participating in parallel discussions. The Bill of
Rights was not in the terms of reference for the Haass-O’Sullivan
talks, but they were asked to consider related matters that opened the
space for other issues to be discussed. The NIHRC and a number of
groups involved in the Bill of Rights process met with the facilitators
while others submitted papers. They took the view that a human
rights-based framework was needed to help resolve the problematic
issues of cultural expression.78 Some non-governmental organizations
("NGOs") argued that the Haass-O’Sullivan process was not,
however, the appropriate place for discussions on the substantive
issue of a Bill of Rights, fearing a "watering down" of the
international standards as politicians bargained over human rights.79
Sinn Féin referenced the issue of the delay on progressing the
proposal in the peace agreement in its submission: "[t]he British
Government has still not introduced a Bill of rights. This void has
contributed in no small measure to the malaise we are currently in,
surrounding these issues."80 The Alliance Party MP stated that
although the issue of the Bill of Rights was important, introducing it
in "the context of trying to resolve one of those issues (parades)
would overburden the process."81
The Haass-O’Sullivan talks concluded without agreement on
December 31, 2013. The final report made a number of
recommendations, such as the establishment of a Commission on
Identity and Culture to consider, amongst other issues, a Bill of
77. The appointment of M. O’Sullivan and R. Haass by the five parties of the Executive
is stated in the Panel’s Mission Statement, available at http://panelofpartiesnie.com/mission/
(last visited Nov. 8, 2016).
78. Together: Building a United Community Strategy and the Multi-Party Group on
Flags, Parades and Dealing with the Past, COMM. ADMIN. JUSTICE (Aug. 2013) (detailing the
briefing from the Committee on the Administration of Justice.)
79. Interview with Nicole Brown, Practice and Participation of Rights, in Belfast (Jan.
24, 2014).
80. Submission on Flags, Symbols and Emblems, SINN FÉIN (Oct. 15, 2013).
81. Interview with Naomi Long, MP, Alliance Party, in Belfast (Oct. 2, 2013). While
noting the need for a dedicated discussion on human rights, the same individual argued that
these discussions might enable the Unionist community to deliver on the need for a wider
framework in which these rights would be placed: “If they were all in the same pool of issues
would it give people flexibility to do some trade around that politically, to be able to deliver on
them?”
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Rights for Northern Ireland.82 Both Sinn Féin83 and the Alliance Party
voiced concerns that placing the Bill of Rights into such a
Commission would mean that there would be far less focus on it since
the process was designed to find a resolution to flags and parades.84
The Irish government did not dismiss its inclusion, believing that it
could be a way to revive the debate but should not preclude other
routes to progress.85 The UK government diverged from the more
usual joint approach with the Irish government,86 with the former
Secretary of State adopting the view that the talks provided the basis
for continuing discussions between the parties.87 The failure of the
Haass-O’Sullivan process reflected at that time a larger failing of the
Northern Irish political parties to independently resolve contentious
issues without the active engagement of the two governments
working together as one.
It remains the case that the British government has failed in their
commitment to bring forward in "Westminster legislation, rights
supplementary to those in the European Convention on Human
Rights, to reflect the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland"88
which is affirmed in the findings of our report where several
politicians and stakeholders emphasized that the UK government bear
the key responsibility:
It is the duty of [the UK] Government as a co-guarantor of the
[A]greement and as a signatory to it to engage proactively with
all stakeholders, including political parties, to seek consensus on
this [Bill of Rights] and other outstanding issues. There is a

82. Proposed Agreement Dec. 13, 2013: An Agreement Among the Parties of the
Northern Ireland Executive on Parades, Select Commemorations, and Related Protests; Flags
and Emblems; and Contending with the Past 17. The Commission would consist of fifteen
members, eight elected representatives to be appointed by the five leaders of the Executive
parties and the other seven members to be outside government.
83. Gerry Adams TD, Sinn Féin, speaking at Ard Chomhairle TV Press Conference,
(Jan. 11, 2014), available at http://www.sinnfein.ie/contents/28417 (last visited May 2, 2016).
84. Interview with Naomi Long, MP, Alliance Party, in Belfast (Feb. 13, 2014).
85. Interview, off-the-record (Feb. 19, 2014).
86. Eamon Gilmore, Former Tánaiste, speaking in the Dáil (Jan. 15, 2014), available at
http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debates%20authoring/debateswebpack.nsf/takes/dail2014
011500005?opendocument (last visited Apr.12, 2016).
87. Theresa Villiers, former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Westminster Hall
(July 16, 2013) in 16 Parl Deb WH (6th ser.) (2013) col. 197 (UK)
88. See Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity, in The Belfast/Good Friday
Agreement, supra note 10, at ¶ 4, 16-17.

98

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40:1

particular responsibility around leadership on such issues when
they are reserved matters.89
The responsibility sits with the UK government. [ . . . ] [W]hat is
crucially missing is an indication from the British government
that their intention is to legislate for something worthy of the
name of a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights.90

This idea of putting pressure on the UK government as a "guarantor"
was reiterated by various respondents: "[t]here is a co-guarantor duty
on the Irish government to keep pressure on them [British
government] as well."91 One political representative went further to
state that in "our view the Irish government has failed in its
responsibilities to press the British."92 Commenting on both the
British and Irish governments’ role, the Progressive Unionist
representative stated:
It’s both the British and Irish [governments] that have allowed
the Northern Irish parties to decide what the Good Friday
Agreement looks like; and that’s been the difficulty. Rather than
saying, ‘no, no, no, this needs to be discussed, (as) this was said
in the Good Friday Agreement’ they’re so happy that the thing
[Bill of Rights] has run for so long…. sometimes it is difficult to
ascertain the difference between the British and Irish
governments now, they seem to have a joint voice on this.93

Some interviewees also believed that the Irish government "has not
been particularly engaged" on the Bill of Rights issue, arguing that it
could be playing a more "vigorous" role94:
The Irish government could be saying more forthrightly that this
is an issue that is still here. It is not going to disappear, it’s a
commitment under the Good Friday Agreement and it needs to be
addressed and that the Irish government is willing to assist in that
process. [ . . . ] Its job is as a guarantor and it can’t do very much
on its own but it can put significant pressure on the British
89. Naomi Long, MP, Alliance Party, at the Westminster Hall (July 16, 2013) in 16 Parl
Deb WH (6th ser.) (2013) col. 191 (UK).
90. Interview with Patrick Corrigan, Amnesty UK, in Belfast (Nov. 6, 2013).
91. Interview with Kevin Hanratty, Human Rights Consortium, in Belfast (Oct. 31,
2013).
92. Interview with Vincent Parker, Special Adviser to the Deputy First Minister, Sinn
Féin, in Belfast (June 7, 2013).
93. Interview with Billy Hutchinson, PUP, in Belfast (Sept. 11, 2013).
94. Interview with Naomi Long, MP, Alliance Party, in Belfast (Oct. 2, 2013).
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government and it can also put some pressure on the parties
locally.95

The Irish government rejects this view, recognizing that they are "coguarantors of the peace agreement"96 and have an obligation to work
towards the implementation of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland.
As the former Taoiseach, Brian Cowen, stated:
Regarding the Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, I reiterate the
commitment of the Government to ensure the full and effective
implementation of all aspect of the Good Friday Agreement and
the St Andrews Agreement. In that context, we attach importance
to a specific Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland as envisaged in
the Good Friday Agreement. The Government has consistently
communicated that position in contacts with the current British
Administration and with the Conservative Party Front Bench.97

The former Tánaiste, Eamon Gilmore, raised the Northern
Ireland Bill of Rights in several speeches referring to the need to
fulfill all parts of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement:
We need to realise in full the potential of the Agreement and all
its parts including a bill of rights. We cannot be selectively blind
to those parts we find difficult. When we pick and choose the
balance and integrity of the whole is picked apart.98

We need to reflect honestly on where there have been gaps left or
intentions and commitments left unfulfilled... This is why
commitments such as the Bill of Rights ... are not optional extras.
They are fundamental. We neglect it at our cost.99
Interviewees recognized that the Irish government is in a different
position than the UK government since the legislative process for any

95. Interview with Alban Maginness, MLA, SDLP, in Belfast (May 1, 2013).
96. Interview, off-the-record (Feb. 19, 2014).
97. See Ceisteanna: Questions, Northern Ireland Issues, 692(3) DÁIL ÉIREANN DEBATE
562 (Oct. 21, 2009), available at http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/ debates%20authoring/
debateswebpack.nsf/takes/dail2009102100004?opendocument (last visited May 1, 2016).
Fianna Fáil was in government in 2009. In 2009, the British Labour party was in government.
In 2011, the Irish government became a coalition between Fine Gael and the Labour Party.
98. Eamon Gilmore, Former Tánaiste, Address to the SDLP Conference Conference
(Nov. 9, 2013), https://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/tags/browsebyyear/2013/4/. The former
Tánaiste also raised the Bill of Rights in his speech to the Alliance Party’s Annual Conference
in April 2012.
99. Eamon Gilmore, Former Tánaiste, Address to the British-Irish Association (Sept. 7,
2013), https://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/tags/browsebyyear/2013/4/.
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Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland will be in the Westminster
Parliament. An official from the Irish government noted that they
could be “more facilitative, give encouragement to look deeper at the
issues."100 As some politicians noted, “if the Irish government go [sic]
too far it will create Unionist antagonism"101 and “would get up the
backs of the DUP.”102 This is exactly what happened when the Irish
Prime Minister, Enda Kenny, commented in January 2016 that there
would be “serious difficulties"103 for Northern Ireland if the United
Kingdom left the European Union following the Brexit referendum in
June 2016. Reacting to this comment, the DUP leader and the First
Minister for Northern Ireland, Arlene Foster, stated, ‘“[i]t is for the
people of the UK to decide what’s the best way forward and, as you
know, we don’t take too kindly to people telling us what to do.”104
However, as noted below, the Irish government needed to articulate
its serious concerns on the implications of Northern Ireland being
encouraged to withdraw from the European Union.
For several years, the lack of either government taking a lead on
a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland has led to a stalemate. In
attempting to tackle this stalemate, the Alliance Party obtained a
formal debate on a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights at Westminster
Hall in 2013. The Alliance Party MP reminded the Secretary of State
that “it is the duty of Government as a co-guarantor of the agreement,
and as a signatory to it, to engage proactively with all stakeholders,
including political parties, to seek consensus on this and other
outstanding issues.”105 In responding to the Westminster debate, the
Secretary of State noted that “the Government would like to see this
issue resolved . . . but we cannot simply conjure consensus into
existence.” 106
100. Interview, off-the-record (Feb. 19, 2014).
101. Interview with Alban Maginness, MLA, SDLP, in Belfast (May 1, 2013).
102. Interview with Anna Lo, MLA, Alliance Party, in Belfast (May 2, 2013).
103. Brexit Would Create Serious Difficulties for NI Says Enda Kenny, BBC NEWS (Jan.
25, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-35395135.
104. Brexit: Arlene Foster Says Enda Kenny Has Right to Express Opinion, BBC News
(Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-35407313 (last visited Apr.
12, 2016).
105. July 16, 2013, Parl Deb HC (2013) col. 190 WH (UK), http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130716/halltext/130716h0001.htm#130
71670000077 (Naomi Long, MP).
106. Theresa Villiers, former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Westminster Hall
(July 16, 2013) in 16 Parl Deb WH (6th ser.) (2013) col. 197 (UK).
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The findings of our report show that when asked to respond to
this, those parties in favor of a Bill of Rights expressed their
dissatisfaction, arguing that unless pressure is applied from
Westminster and parties are “incentivized,”107 then a process will not
get started:
At the moment the government are taking what they claim is a
neutral position. But, by taking a neutral position, they are
effectively not progressing and therefore are on the side of no
movement.108

The parties, in favor of progressing a Bill of Rights for Northern
Ireland, also noted that the proposals in the Good Friday/Belfast
Agreement had been endorsed by a Northern Ireland referendum and
the outcome in favor of the peace agreement (including the proposal
for a Bill of Rights) still stands. The parties believed that they were
being left to be persuaders with the UK government having adopted a
position that “those who are in favour of a Bill of Rights . . . should
focus their efforts on persuading those in Northern Ireland who
remain skeptical [sic] on building such a consensus.”109 However,
these parties argue that it should not be their responsibility to
persuade others of the need for a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland,
as this responsibility lies with the government.110 This concern was
further highlighted in 2014 in a Westminster debate on a Northern
Ireland Bill, where the SDLP took the opportunity to criticize the
government’s current position of inaction on the Northern Ireland Bill
of Rights. Margaret Ritchie MP noted:
There are rights that are peculiar to Northern Ireland, which has a
particular political situation that needs to be recognised. I regret
the fact that the Government did not see fit to introduce a Bill of
Rights that could have run concurrently with this Bill through
both Houses. I ask the Minister to reflect on that . . . to talk to his

107. Interview with David Ford, MLA, Alliance Party of N. Ir., in Belfast (Nov. 25,
2013).
108. Interview with Naomi Long, MP, Alliance Party, of N. Ir., in Belfast (Oct. 2, 2013).
109. Letter from Mike Penning, former Minister of State for Northern Ireland to the
authors (May 24, 2013), in response to a letter from the authors to Theresa Villiers, former
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Mar. 26, 2013) (on file with authors).
110. This was the position stated by all interviewees from parties in favor of the
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights. Interviews with the Alliance Party (Nov. 25, 2013; Sinn Féin,
June 7, 2013; and the SDLP, May 1, 2013).
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colleagues in government, and to ensure that such legislation is
introduced.111

However, the then-Minister of State for Northern Ireland did not
appear to be familiar with the proposal for a Northern Ireland Bill of
Rights as demonstrated by his response:
We have the Human Rights Act 1998 in place, and if all parties
in Northern Ireland wish to propose some special legislation at
the Westminster Parliament, we would of course consider it, but I
see no need for such a thing, and I have never heard anybody
suggest there was a need before.112

This explicit acknowledgement shows a fundamental lack of
understanding within the Conservative government about a Northern
Ireland Bill of Rights. Had the former Minister of State for Northern
Ireland read the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, “he would
understand that it contains an entire page and chapter dedicated to
human rights . . . and] that the agreement contains a specific
obligation about a Bill of Rights in Northern Ireland.”113
Several other political representatives have also expressed their
concern at the UK government’s “rollback.”114 Another former
political spokesperson went so far as to state that “we’re in a worse
position than we were when we started.”115 The spokesperson
continued to state that as far as the British government is concerned:
. . . we have held the consultations, we have held the community
forums, we have held the intense political discussions. We’re
now at the position where there was only one decision to make
and that was whether to implement it [the NIHRC’s advice] or

111. Mar. 12, 2014, Parl Deb HC (2014) col. 370 (UK) (Margaret Ritchie, MP, SDLP).
112. Mar. 12, 2014, Parl Deb HC (2014) col. 376 (UK) Andrew Robathan, former
Minister of State for Northern Ireland (October 2013 – July 2014).
113. Mar. 12, 2014, Parl Deb HC (2014) col 376 (UK) (Lady Sylvia Hermon, MP,
Independent MP for North Down). In response to the former NIO Minister’s admission in this
debate that he had not read the Agreement since 1998, the MP for North Down also added, “It
would be wise, after 16 years for the Minister, before coming back to speak on an important
piece of Northern Ireland legislation, to read the Good Friday agreement, the Belfast
Agreement, in detail.”
114. Interview with Alban Maginness, MLA, Socialist Democratic and Labour Party, in
Belfast (May 1, 2013).
115. Interview with Vincent Parker, Special Adviser to deputy First Minister, Sinn Féin,
in Belfast (June 7, 2013).
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not to implement it - and that is even implementing it in a slightly
different format than what’s been proposed.116

The leader of the UUP acknowledged that “the main political parties
together haven’t sat down and engaged on it”117 and admitted that:
Would we vote in favour tomorrow for a Northern Ireland Bill of
Rights? The answer would be no, because we don’t see the
argument and the need. But if you come to me and say – have
you thought of this and this, and you can persuade us then we
would come around to it.118

The leader of the UUP added, “I think that there would be merit in
looking at a Bill of Rights because it’s a commitment that’s sat in the
Belfast Agreement and fifteen years on, clearly no one has really
seriously engaged.”119 Likewise, the DUP spokesperson also noted,
“we are open to any discussions that are going on and any proposals
that are being brought forward.”120 Sinn Féin believed that what was
needed was a little bit of “hard-talk . . . the government (needs to)
have a plan or a structure because otherwise . . . we are back in the
same place. We’d just be updating positions.”121 Sinn Féin added a
proviso that “we have to find something different”122 but what the
“something different” might look like was not elaborated on. The
leader of the Alliance Party also believed that an alternative approach
was needed and opined that “a facilitation process, speaking to the
parties and then putting forward proposals is the only real prospect we
have.”123 The Alliance Party MP took the view that "getting parties
around the table is a starting point . . . but that process needs to be
very focused and time-limited.”124 The Sinn Féin party leader also
noted the need for greater focus: “issues such as a Bill of Rights . . .

116. Id.
117. Interview with Mike Nesbitt, MLA, UUP, in Belfast (June 7, 2013).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Jonathan Bell, Junior Minister. Interview with Jonathan Bell, MLA, Democratic
Unionist Party, and Emma Little, DUP, MLA, Democratic Unionist Party, in Belfast (May 21,
2013).
121. Interview with Vincent Parker, Special Adviser to Deputy First Minister, Sinn Féin,
in Belfast (June 7, 2013).
122. Id.
123. Interview with David Ford, MLA, Alliance Party, of N. Ir. in Belfast (Nov. 25,
2013).
124. Interview with Naomi Long, MP, Alliance Party, of N. Ir., in Belfast (Oct. 2, 2013).
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are not going away”125 and remain to be resolved in the near future.
The findings of our report therefore show that all parties are willing to
engage in this issue and seek “something different.” Even the failure
of the recent political talks/agreements such as the Haass-O’Sullivan
talks (July-December 2013),126 the Stormont House Agreement
(December 2014),127 and the Fresh Start Agreement (November
2015)128 highlights the pressing need to provide an alternative
approach.
III. ALTERNATIVE TO THE PRESENT STALEMATE
As the co-guarantors of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, we
argue that the British and Irish governments need to establish a
coherent approach to a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland by
developing a joint policy framework. The framework should clarify
how the governments see their respective roles in implementing their
obligations under the Belfast/Good Friday and St Andrews
Agreements and agree how best to take forward the work on a Bill of
Rights for Northern Ireland. The importance of moving forward on a
Bill of Rights is particularly important in divided societies emerging
from decades of violent political conflict. As noted earlier, Bills of
Rights “are traditional and well used constitutional mechanisms”129 in
“conflicted/transitional” societies130 as they act as a bridge in helping
countries transition from conflict to move forward from “a
125. Gerry Adams, TD, Presidential Address to Sinn Féin at ArdFheis 2014, (Feb. 8,
2014), http://www.sinnfein.ie/ga/contents/28950 (last visited May 2, 2016).
126. The Haass-O’Sulivan final report made a number of recommendations, one of
which was that a Commission on Identity and Culture be set up to consider amongst other
issues a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. See THE HAASS-O’SULLIVAN FINAL REPORT,
(July-Dec., 2013) (on file with authors).
127. THE STORMONT HOUSE AGREEMENT (Dec. 2014), https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/390672/Stormont_House_Agreemen
t.pdf (last visited May 2, 2016), at ¶ 69. The Bill of rights appears under the “Outstanding
Commitment” section.
128. A FRESH START: THE STORMONT AGREEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (Nov.
17, 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
479116/A_Fresh_Start_-_The_Stormont_Agreement_and_Implementation_Plan__Final_Version_20_Nov_2015_for_PDF.pdf. The Bill of Rights is mentioned only in passing
towards the end of the Agreement in Section F in paragraph 69. This paragraph repeats the
relevant paragraphs of the Stormont House Agreement but, in contrast with other issues where
next steps are identified, no such steps are set out to deal with the Bill of Rights issue.
129. Harvey, supra note 66, at 56-57.
130. Christine Bell, Colin Campbell & Fionnuala Ní Aoláin et. al., Justice Discourses in
Transition 13:3 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 305, 310 (2004).
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contentious past as well as being a point of reference for future
generations.”131 While their effectiveness “is highly context
dependent,”132 Bills of Rights have been “convenient device[s]”133 for
countries coming out of conflict.
The two governments need to adopt a consistent approach to the
implementation of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement. While the
Irish government regards a separate Bill of Rights for Northern
Ireland as an integral part of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement,134
the British government believes that a UK Bill of Rights could serve
all devolved regions, including Northern Ireland.135 Clarification is
therefore necessary to reconcile the current differences in both
governments’ approach to this issue.
IV. THE "WHAT IF" SCENARIOS
The UK government’s plan for the replacement of the Human
Rights Act with a British Bill of Rights remains unclear as the
proposals have yet to be published. While we know the results of the
Brexit referendum,136 there are several variables post-Brexit, such as
the fundamental issue about the future protection of EU-related rights

131. Northern Ireland Human Rights Comm’r, supra note 13, at 3.
132. Harvey, supra note 66, at 56-57.
133. Id.
134. “A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland remains a significant piece of unfinished
work in this area. The Irish Government, as co-guarantor of the Agreement, will continue to
work to ensure that this and all other outstanding provisions from the Agreement are fully and
effectively implemented.” Eamon Gilmore, Former Tánaiste, Address to the Irish Human
Rights Commission, Dublin (June 28, 2011), available at https://www.dfa.ie/news-andmedia/speeches/speeches-archive/2011/june/irish-human-rights-commission/. In 2013, the Bill
of Rights was raised in the Irish parliament on at least twelve occasions. Of those, eight were
specifically requesting the Tánaiste update the Dáil on what work he had undertaken, usually
relating to his communication with the Northern Ireland Secretary of State, specifically,
regarding the Bill of Rights; on the other four incidences, it was discussed as one of the
outstanding elements of the Peace Agreement. See Dáil Éireann 2013, HOUSES OF THE
OIREACHTAS (2016), http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debates%20authoring/debatesweb
pack.nsf/datelist?readform&chamber=dail&year=2013 (last visited May 2, 2016).
135. Brian Gormally, supra note 5.
136. The United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union by 52% to 48% on the June
23, 2016. England and Wales voted to leave (53.4% and 52.5% respectively), Scotland and
Northern Ireland voted to remain (55.8% and 62.0% respectively). See EU Referendum
Results, BBC News (June 23, 2016), http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/politics/eu_referendum/
results.
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in Northern Ireland, to be considered.137 What will happen now with
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights?138 This Charter is stronger
than the ECHR as it includes a broader range of rights (notably
economic, social, and cultural rights in addition to civil and political
rights), as well as freedom of movement for EU citizens within the
European Union and data protection.
However, it is important to acknowledge that the Charter does
have several limitations, such as its scope being restricted to EU
laws.139 Further, the Charter and its enforcement body, the European
Court of Justice, make a distinction between "rights" and
"principles."140 This means that although a "right" exists in language,
it does not mean that it will be directly enforceable. Most of the socioeconomic rights are "principles."141 The most notable example is the
Court of Justice’s interpretation of Article 27 of the Charter in the
AMS case, where the Court concluded that Article 27 was not a
right.142 This case highlights that while on its face the Charter
recognizes the indivisibility of rights, socio-economic rights are not
accorded equal weight with civil and political rights.143 Another
137. Brexit raises a myriad of legal, political, economic, and constitutional issues. It is
beyond the scope of this article to address these issues. For information on some of these
issues, see LSE Commission on the Future of Britain in Europe, LONDON SCH. ECON. (June 7,
2016) http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LSE-Commission/LSE-Commission-on-the-Fu
ture-of-Britain-in-Europe.aspx (last visited July 27, 2016). See also House of Commons
Library, Briefing Paper, Brexit: What happens next? Number 07632, June 30, 2016; House of
Commons Library Briefing Paper, Brexit: Some legal and constitutional issues and
alternatives to EU membership, Number 07214, July 28, 2016.
138. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 51, 2012 O.J. C
326/391. The Charter of Fundamental Rights was given legal footing by the Lisbon treaty
2007 (Article 6 EU Treaty) and is therefore legally binding.
139. Article 51 of the EU Charter states that it applies to the EU Member States “only
when they are implementing Union law.” Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union art. 51, 2012 O.J. C 326/391.
140. For a comprehensive discussion about the limits, see Koen Lenaerts, Exploring the
Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 8(3) EUR. CONST. L. REV. 375 (2012).
141. Socio-economic rights are grouped under the “Solidarity” chapter (Title IV) of the
Charter. For a list of the solidarity rights, see EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Title IV:
Solidarity, EU AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RTS. (2016), http://fra.europa.eu/en/
charterpedia/title/iv-solidarity (last visited July 27, 2016).
142. AMS, Case C-176/12 (Jan. 15, 2014), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62012CJ0176.
143. For an excellent discussion about the role and nature of the EU Charter post-Brexit,
see The Implications of Brexit for Fundamental Rights Protection in the UK, LONDON SCH.
ECON. EUR. INST. (Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LSE-Commission/
Hearing-6---The-implications-of-Brexit-for-fundamental-rights-protection-in-the-UK.pdf.
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important question concerns whether Northern Ireland and the United
Kingdom will be bereft of specific legislation if they no longer have
to implement EU directives. Northern Ireland has benefitted in
particular from a range of EU equality legislation (such as the Race
Equality Directive and the Employment Equality Directive). As one
human rights lawyer puts it, "Brexit and a possible decoupling of
domestic law from the underlying Directives that have given rise to
these rights would cause these to probably fluctuate."144
Repealing the Human Rights Act also raises a series of
fundamental questions, such as whether replacing the Human Rights
Act with a UK Bill of Rights would be a "grievous breach of the
Good Friday Agreement."145 If the UK government did this, what
could or would the Irish government do? Does it mean that Northern
Ireland would not have its own specific Bill of Rights? Or does it
present an opportunity for a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights? Does the
British government require the consent of the devolved assemblies,
including the Northern Ireland Assembly, to proceed with both its
proposals to repeal the Human Rights Act and Brexit? In an attempt
to respond to the questions above, we provide a series of "what if"
scenarios. Before doing so, some background information on the
government’s plans on repealing the Human Rights Act is provided.
V. CONSERVATIVE’S PROPOSALS TO REPEAL THE HUMAN
RIGHTS ACT
Over the past six years, the Conservative party has repeated its
intention to "scrap the Human Rights Act altogether."146 Its plans
144. Id. at 7. Brexit also raises the question about “acquired rights” in EU law.
“Acquired rights” are rights already conferred by the EU such as workers’ rights and nondiscrimination rights. Once these rights have been recognized, they cannot be revoked even if
a member state withdraws from the EU. Space precludes a detailed discussion about these
acquired rights and Brexit. For an excellent discussion, see Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, What
Happens to ‘Acquired Rights’ in the Event of a Brexit?, UK CONST. L. BLOG (May 16, 2016),
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/05/16/sionaidh-douglas-scott-what-happens-to-acquiredrights-in-the-event-of-a-brexit/ (last visited July 27, 2016).
145. Human Rights Act: Gerry Adams Criticises ‘Attack’ on NI Peace Deal, BBC NEWS,
(May 13, 2015), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-32721851 (last visited May
2, 2016).
146. See Theresa May, Speech at the Conservative Party Conference (Oct. 2012),
http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2012/10/09/theresa-may-speech-in-full. More in
detail, dating back to as early as 2006, David Cameron (as Opposition Leader at that time)
talked about replacing the Human Rights Act with a “Bill of Rights defining Britain’s core
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were elaborated in the 2014 publication of a strategy paper,
"Protecting Human Rights in the UK."147 This document sets out the
Conservative’s plans to introduce "a new British Bill of Rights and
Responsibilities"148 with nine "key objectives."149 As these objectives
have been examined elsewhere, we focus here on the points relevant
to our discussion.150 Generally, the Conservative’s proposals are to
"repeal Labour’s Human Rights Act."151 To this end, the
Conservatives propose to introduce a "British Bill of Rights and
Responsibilities" that will limit the scope of human rights laws to "the
most serious cases" and restrict the reach of the cases to the UK. The
proposals also refer to rendering Strasbourg judgments as "advisory"
and "break[ing] the formal link between British courts and the
European Court of Human Rights,"152 with the British courts no
longer being required to take into account Strasbourg rulings.153 If the
Council of Europe does not agree with these proposals, the
Conservatives' only alternative for the United Kingdom is to
withdrawal from the ECHR.154
As the UK government does not intend to add new rights in the
proposed British Bill of Rights,155 the key issue is how any rights
should be adjudicated. In other words, it is more to do with breaking
values.” Hélène Mulholland, Cameron ‘Muddled’ on Human Rights, THE GUARDIAN (June 26,
2006), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2006/jun/26/immigrationpolicy.constitution (last
visited Apr. 29, 2016). This pledge was repeated in the Conservative’s 2010 manifesto,
Invitation to Join the Government of Britain: The Conservative Manifesto 79 (2010), https://
www.conservatives.com/~/media/files/activist%20centre/press%20and%20policy/manifestos/
manifesto2010. At the Conservative’s annual conference in 2014, the then Home Secretary
announced that they would repeal the Human Rights Act and replace it with a British Bill of
Rights.
147. See Theresa May, Speech at the Conservative Party Conference (Oct. 2012),
http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2012/10/09/theresa-may-speech-in-full.
148. THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, supra note 3, at 5.
149. Id.
150. Steven Greer & Rosie Slowe, The Conservatives’ Proposals for a British Bill of
Rights: Mired in Muddle Misconception and Misrepresentation? 4 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
372 (2015). Steven Greer and Rosie Slowe provide an excellent analysis of the Conservative’s
policy document.
151. THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, supra note 3.
152. Id. at 5.
153. Id. at 6.
154. Id. at 5.
155. “There is nothing wrong with that original document [referring to the ECHR] . . .
We will not introduce new basic rights.” Id. In November 2015, the former Justice Secretary
stated that “Our Bill of Rights will be based on the Convention rights.”
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the formal link between British courts and the European Court of
Human Rights. This point is explicitly made in the Conservative’s
2015 manifesto:
The next Conservative Government will scrap the Human Rights
Act, and introduce a British Bill of Rights. This will break the
formal link between British courts and the European Court of
Human Rights, and make our own Supreme Court the ultimate
arbiter of human rights matters in the UK.156

However, in the Queen’s speech in May 2016, there is a reference
only to "proposals,"157 and not a Bill for a British Bill of Rights.158
There has therefore been a hiatus in bringing forward such a Bill and,
despite several appearances of the then-Parliamentary UnderSecretary for Justice and the then-Minister of Justice before various
select committees in 2015 and 2016 and ministerial statements on this
issue,159 the public has been left "baffled and a bit in the dark."160
156. CONSERVATIVE PARTY, STRONG LEADERSHIP: A CLEAR ECONOMIC PLAN. A
BRIGHTER, MORE SECURE FUTURE: THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY MANIFESTO (Apr. 2015),
https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto [hereinafter CONSERVATIVE PARTY MANIFESTO].
157. THE QUEEN’S SPEECH BEFORE HER MAJESTY’S MOST GRACIOUS SPEECH TO BOTH
HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT ON 18 MAY 2016 48 (May 18, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/524040/Queen_s_Speech_2016_bac
kground_notes_.pdf (last visited June 7, 2016) [hereinafter THE QUEEN’S SPEECH 2016].
158. The Queen’s Speech repeats last year’s speech. See THE QUEEN’S SPEECH BEFORE
HER MAJESTY’S MOST GRACIOUS SPEECH TO BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT ON 27 MAY
2015 8 (May 18, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/430149/QS_lobby_pack_FINAL_NEW_2.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2016)
[hereinafter THE QUEEN’S SPEECH 2015].
159. In response to a question in the House of Commons about the consultation on
proposals for a British Bill of Rights, Dominic Raab (former Parliamentary Under-Secretary,
Ministry of Justice) replied that proposals would be introduced in Autumn 2015 and would be
“subject to full consultation.” See Sept. 2015 Parl Deb HC (2015) col. 2058 (UK) (Dominic
Raab). In response to a letter from the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights (Harriet
Harman), asking about proposed timings, see Joint Committee on Human Rights, Letter to the
Justice Secretary about the Bill of Rights (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.equalityhumanrights
.com/en/file/17111/download?token=bi-FE9rU (last visited Mar. 3, 2016). Michael Gove (the
former Minister of Justice and former Attorney General) was non-committal, stating only that
the government consultation would be a “thorough, transparent and productive exercise with a
wide stakeholder group.” See Justice Secretary’s Response to Joint Committee on Human
Right’s letter about the Bill of Rights (Nov. 27, 2015), http://www.parliament.uk/documents/
joint-committees/human-rights/Michael_Gove_Letter_Bill_of_Rights_271115.pdf (last visited
Mar. 3, 2016). In December 2015, according to the former Attorney General, a consultation
document was “being shared” with government colleagues. It would then go to the relevant
committees and then a consultation would begin sometime in the “new year.” See House of
Lords, The Select Committee on the Constitution, Oral Evidence Session with the Right
Honourable Michael Gove MP, Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, Evidence
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One of the main reasons for the delay of such a Bill is the
complicated issue of devolution and, as far as Northern Ireland is
concerned, the impact of the government’s proposals for the Good
Friday/Belfast Agreement. As discussed earlier, the Agreement is
replete with references to human rights, not least the requirement on
the British government to "complete incorporation"161 into Northern
Session No. 1 Heard in Public, Questions 1 – 12 (Dec. 2, 2015), http://data.parliament.uk/
writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/constitution-committee/lordchancellor/oral/28327.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2016). When questioned again about this in an
appearance before the House of Lords EU Justice Sub-committee in February 2016, the former
Attorney General’s initial response was that the consultation paper would be announced
“soon,” but after further probing from the Committee, he stated that he was “at the mercy of
the Prime Minister,” and while not committing to a date, remained “confident” that “there will
not be too long to wait.” See House of Lords, Revised Transcript of Evidence Taken Before
The Select Committee on the European Union, Justice Sub-Committee Inquiry on the Potential
Impact on EU Law of Repealing the Human Rights Act, Evidence Session No. 8, Heard in
Public, Questions 79 – 90 (Feb. 2, 2016). Witnesses: Rt Hon Mr Michael Gove MP and Mr
Dominic Raab MP, http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/
evidencedocument/eu-justice-subcommittee/potential-impact-of-repealing-the-human-rightsact-on-eu-law/oral/28347.html (last visited May 2, 2016). The Final report was published in
May 2016, House of Lords, European Union Committee, The UK, the EU and a British Bill of
Rights 12th Report of Session 2015-2016 (May 2016), http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/139/139.pdf (last visited June 7, 2016). On April
26, 2016, Dominic Raab’s vague response provides no further light on this issue as he talked
about proposals being published “in due course.” See Oral Answers To Questions on a British
Bill
of
Rights,
26
April
2016,
Parl
Deb
HC
(2016)
col.
608,
https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2016-04-26/debates/16042636000018/BritishBill
OfRights (last visited Nov. 8, 2016). On May 17, 2016, Michael Gove sent a letter in reply
from the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights on the Bill of Rights giving very little
away by merely stating that his ministerial team would be happy to discuss the government’s
proposals further without indicating when that will take place. See Former Justice Secretary’s
Response to Joint Committee on Human Right’s Letter about the Bill of Rights (May 17,
2016) http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/human-rights/correspondence/
160517_Letter_MG_to_Chair_BoR.PDF (last visited June 8, 2016).
160. Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Chairman), The Select Committee on the
European Union Justice Sub-Committee Inquiry on the Potential Impact on EU Law of
Repealing Human Rights Act, Evidence Session No. 8, Heard in Public 2 February 2016,
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eujustice-subcommittee/potential-impact-of-repealing-the-human-rights-act-on-eu-law/oral/
28347.html (last visited Nov. 8 2016). There was speculation that the previous government’s
plan to replace the Human Rights Act had been shelved, however the Justice Secretary, Liz
Truss MP, stated in the House of Commons on September 6, 2016 that the government will
proceed with plans to replace the Human Rights with a British Bill of Rights. See
http://www.parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/3184e13a-c51f-4940-836b-66c97226e358
(last
visited Sept. 6, 2016).
161. Good Friday/Belfast Agreement, supra note 10, at Annex 1, ¶ 2 (covering “Rights,
Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity.”).
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Irish law of the ECHR, and to provide "direct access"162 to courts and
remedies for any alleged breaches of the ECHR. The ECHR also
applies to the Northern Ireland Assembly since its legislation cannot
breach the rights contained in the ECHR "and any Bill of Rights for
Northern Ireland supplementing it."163 Such legislative proposals
would be rendered "null and void" should they not be in alignment
with the Convention rights.164 The incorporation of the ECHR into
domestic legislation was given effect on October 2, 2000 with the
1998 Human Rights Act and the Northern Ireland Act of 1998 giving
statutory footing to these commitments.165 This raises two questions.
First, would replacing the Human Rights Act with a British or a "UK
Bill of Rights"166 be a breach of these commitments? Second, is the
consent of the Northern Ireland legislative Assembly required both in
terms of repealing the Human Rights Act and also for Brexit? These
questions will be dealt with respectively.
Under "what if" scenario one, where a UK Bill of Rights does
not affect the existing protections under the ECHR, there would be no
legal or technical breach. What about scenario two, where a UK Bill
of Rights makes changes to the Convention rights within the meaning
of the Human Rights Act, resulting in an "ECHR-minus"167 Bill of
Rights? Arguably under this scenario, there is a "significant risk"168 of
breaching the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement. Such a Bill will
arguably be "an emaciated version of human rights . . . [and will not]
further the human-rights-based purposes of the Good Friday/[Belfast]
Agreement."169 The likelihood of this scenario where a UK Bill of
162. Id.
163. Id., at Strand I, ¶ 26.
164. Id.
165. The Human Rights Act gives “direct effect” to most of the ECHR rights in domestic
law. Under Northern Ireland Act 1998, §§ 6(1), 6(2)(c), and 7(1) (this Act was passed “to
make new provision for the government of Northern Ireland for the purpose of implementing
the agreement reached at multi-party talks on Northern Ireland . . . .”), the Assembly does not
have legislative competence for the Human Rights Act and ECHR rights.
166. Evidence of Gove and Raab to the House of Lords, Revised transcript of evidence
taken before The Select Committee on the European Union, Justice Sub-Committee Inquiry on
the Potential Impact on EU Law of Repealing the Human Rights Act, 2016, Evidence Session
No. 8 [hereinafter The House of Lords, Justice Sub-Committee Inquiry on the Potential Impact
on EU Law of Repealing Human Rights Act].
167. Murray et al., supra note 5, at 21.
168. Gallagher et al., supra note 5, at 5.
169. Aoife O’Donoghue & Ben Warwick, Constitutionally Questioned: UK Debates,
International Law and Northern Ireland, 66:1 N.I.L.Q 93, 100 (2015).
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Rights makes changes to the ECHR is very real, given the admission
by the former Attorney General before a Select Committee on the
European Union in February 2016 that "there will be some
changes"170 to the Human Rights Act. In particular, one of these
changes refers to Section 2 of the Human Rights Act, which requires
UK courts to take into account Strasbourg jurisprudence when
interpreting ECHR rights.171 The former Attorney General believes
there is an imbalance between the European Court of Human Rights
and UK courts, with the latter favoring the former.172 For some
commentators, it is this imbalance and the government’s desire to
"break the formal link"173 between British courts and the European
Court of Human Rights that is at the "core"174 of the government’s
plans. Repetitive references to the UK courts having the ultimate say
in the interpretation of ECHR rights and the emphasis placed on
parliamentary sovereignty by the Conservatives in both written
publications and oral evidence before the various parliamentary
committees sustains this view. For example, when giving evidence
before the Select Committee on the Constitution, Michael Gove
referred to parliamentary sovereignty on several occasions.175 For
170. House of Lords, Justice Sub-Committee Inquiry on the Potential Impact on EU Law
of Repealing Human Rights Act, supra note 166.
171. House of Lords, Justice Sub-Committee Inquiry on the Potential Impact on EU Law
of Repealing Human Rights Act, supra note 166. The Chairman stated that “It is pedestrian to
state that there is no legal obligation for the UK courts to follow Strasbourg rulings since this
is ‘almost written as an accepted tenet.’”
172. See The House of Lords, Justice Sub-Committee Inquiry on the Potential Impact on
EU Law of Repealing Human Rights Act, supra note 166. Mr. Gove states that “Section 2 of
the Act in particular might put the balance rather too heavily in Strasbourg’s court rather than
in our own when it comes to the interpretation of those rights.”
173. THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, supra note 3, at 6.
174. Grainne Mellon, British Plans to Repeal Human Rights Act Misguided and
Unnecessary, IRISH TIMES (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/british-plansto-repeal-human-rights-act-misguided-and-unnecessary-1.2424110 (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
175. “I am attached to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. . . . Parliamentary
sovereignty is the essence of our democracy.” House of Lords, The Select Committee on the
Constitution, Oral Evidence Session with the Right Honourable Michael Gove MP, former
Lord C. Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, Dec. 2, 2015. Then, on February 2,
2016, Mr. Gove stated, “we need to ensure that we uphold parliamentary sovereignty.” In the
Conservative’s proposals in 2014, there are several references to the UK courts having the
“final say” and parliamentary sovereignty: “The UK Courts, not Strasbourg, will have the final
say in interpreting Convention Rights, as clarified by Parliament . . . It [referring to a British
Bill of Rights] will ensure that Parliament is the ultimate source of legal authority, and that the
Supreme Court is indeed supreme in the interpretation of the law . . . In all matters related to
our international commitments, Parliament is sovereign . . . The European Court of Human
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those who adopt a broad interpretation of "incorporation" to go
beyond "incorporating" the text of the ECHR and to include
Strasbourg rulings, it follows that any forthcoming Bill of Rights that
prevents UK courts from "taking into account" Strasbourg
jurisprudence and "the positions of other Council of Europe
institutions"176 could result in lowering rights protection. This may
result in a breach of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, as it is
"remov[ing] one route of effective protection . . . [of] international
oversight."177 Such oversight is essential in states where
parliamentary sovereignty is sacrosanct (such as the United Kingdom)
as it is a way of "controlling [States’] unfettered power."178
Another way of limiting the effectiveness of this "international
oversight" is by reducing the European Court of Human Rights to an
advisory body.179 Other real possibilities include limiting the UK Bill
of Rights to "the most serious cases";180 preventing "terrorists and
other serious foreign criminals who pose a threat to our society from
using spurious human rights arguments to prevent deportation";181 and
limiting the reach of a UK Bill of Rights to the UK so that British
troops abroad can "operate effectively in a conflict zone" without
Rights is no longer binding over the UK Supreme Court . . . Labour’s Human Rights Act
undermines the sovereignty of Parliament, and democratic accountability to the public.” THE
CONSERVATIVE PARTY, supra note 3, at 4-6. Further, in February 2016, the former Prime
Minister supported the idea of a Sovereignty Act. Such an Act never materialized and was not
included in the Queen’s Speech in 2016. See Mark Elliot, Why a Sovereignty Act Makes No
Legal Sense, PUB. L. FOR EVERYONE BLOG (May 27, 2015), https://publiclawforeveryone
.com/2015/05/27/why-a-sovereignty-act-makes-no-legal-sense-a-short-response-to-danielhannan-mep/ (last visited June 7, 2016); see also Charles Moore, The Red Herring that was the
Sovereignty Bill, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/
eureferendum/12185548/The-red-herring-that-was-the-Sovereignty-Bill.html (last visited Mar.
25, 2016). The most recent reference to the sovereignty of Parliament is in the Queen’s speech
in May 2016, where reference is made that “her ministers will uphold the sovereignty of
Parliament.” THE QUEEN’S SPEECH 2016, supra note 157. For a detailed analysis on this point
about sovereignty and the British Bill of Rights, see Mark Elliot, The 2016 Queen’s Speech
and the Constitution, PUB. L. FOR EVERYONE BLOG (May 18, 2016),
https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2016/05/18/the-2016-queens-speech-and-the-constitution/.
176. Human Rights Act (1998) § 2 (Eng.).
177. Gormally, supra note 4; see also Murray et al., supra note 5; Gallagher et al., supra
note 5.
177. Gormally, supra note 5.
178. Id.
179. THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, supra note 3.
180. Id.
181. CONSERVATIVE PARTY MANIFESTO, supra note 156, at 147.
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being "constrained . . . by a variety of laws and treaties."182 This raises
issues of compatibility with not only the ECHR, but also international
human rights and humanitarian law that the United Kingdom signed
and/or are jus cogens.
Further, to render the European Court of Human Rights an
advisory body directly conflicts with Article 46(1) of the ECHR,
which requires Member States to "undertake to abide by the judgment
of the court in any case to which they are a parties."183 Nor, given its
lack of clarity, would limiting cases to "the most serious cases" be
compatible with the ECHR. The government’s plans are therefore
trying to reconcile the irreconcilable: instead of building upon the
protections of the Human Rights Act, the British government is in the
"unusual and unedifying position"184 of proposing to repeal and
weaken existing human rights protection. Such a Bill would therefore
not only be "tamper[ing] with existing human rights protection"185 but
risk undermining the role the ECHR plays in Northern Ireland under
the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement. The findings of the recent House
of Lords EU Justice subcommittee on a British Bill of Rights
concludes that the ECHR and the Human Rights Act plays a "vital
role" in the implementation of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement.186
The centrality of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement has also
been recognized by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human
Rights. The Commissioner recognizes that the ECHR’s role has a
"particular resonance" in Northern Ireland . . . where the ECHR is part
of the Good Friday Agreement, and where the Human Rights Act
underpins key policing institutions."187 The Irish government has also
expressed similar sentiments:

182. The House of Lords, Justice Sub-Committee Inquiry on the Potential Impact on EU
Law of Repealing Human Rights Act, supra note 166.
183
The European Convention on Human Rights, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Docu
ments/Convention_ENG.pdf
184. Mellon, supra note 174.
185. June 15, 2015, Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2015) col. 108, (UK) (Clause 2, the Sewel
Convention).
186. The House of Lords European Union Committee, The UK, the EU and a British Bill
of Rights, 2015-16, HL 139, at 48, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld
201516/ldselect/ldeucom/139/139.pdf (last visited June 6, 2016).
187. Nils Muižnieks, Comm’r for Human Rights, UK: Forthcoming Reforms to Human
Rights Law Must Not Weaken Protection, COUNCIL EUR. (Jan. 22, 2016), http://
www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/uk-forthcoming-reforms-to-human-rights-law-must-not-
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[T]he Good Friday/Belfast Agreement is clear that the European
Convention on Human Rights must be incorporated into law in
Northern Ireland….. In addition, a strong human rights
framework, including external supervision by the European Court
of Human Rights, has been an essential part of the peace process
and anything that undermines this, or is perceived to undermine
this, could have serious consequences for the operation of the
Good Friday/Belfast Agreement.188

More recently, the Irish government "expressed a very strong view"189
about the British government’s plans to repeal the Human Rights Act.
The opposition from the Irish government is welcomed, and if the
British government continues with its proposals and produces a
scenario type two Bill of Rights (referred to earlier), the Irish
government will have to do more than send strongly worded letters
and issue ministerial statements expressing its strong opposition. It
will have to hold the British government accountable for failing to
fulfill its commitment from the 1998 peace agreement to initiate a
process to progress a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights. This argument
emanates from the Agreement’s dual status: it is both a multi-party
agreement amongst the main political parties190 and a bi-lateral treaty
between the British and Irish governments.191 Article 2 of the bilateral
agreement requires the UK government to implement provisions of
weaken-protection (last visited Apr. 6, 2016). Nils Muižnieks visited the United Kingdom on
January 22, 2016. Following this visit, he published this speech.
188. Letter from Frances Fitzgerald, Minister for Justice and Equality, to Michael Gove
MP, the then Lord Chancellor (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lordscommittees/eu-justice-subcommittee/RepealofHRAeffectonEULaw/Minister-FrancesFitzgerald-toSofSJus.pdf.
189. Pat Leahy, Post-Brexit Repeal of the Human Rights Act Opposed by State, IRISH
TIMES (July 11, 2016), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/uk/post-brexit-repeal-of-human
-rights-act-in-north-opposed-by-state-1.2717402 (last visited Aug. 9, 2016).
190. See generally Christine Bell, ON THE LAW OF PEACE: PEACE AGREEMENTS AND
THE LEX PACIFICATORIA (2008) (providing further information on the duality of the Good
Friday/Belfast Agreement). With the exception of the DUP who formally opposed and is not a
signatory of the Agreement.
191. Compare Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland (Apr. 10, 1998), 2114 U.N.T.S.
473, with Northern Ireland Peace Agreement (The Good Friday Agreement) (Oct. 4, 1998), Gr.
Brit.-N. Ir., https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136
652/agreement.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2016). The Good Friday Agreement is an Annex to
the treaty and is referred to in its core provisions. The Agreement was incorporated as a treaty
between the United Kingdom and Ireland and lodged with the United Nations. See 4705
U.N.T.S. 50.
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the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement.192 Under the provisions of the
Good Friday/Belfast Agreement, the NIHRC was mandated to advise
on "rights supplementary to the ECHR,"193 and on December 10,
2008, the NIHRC submitted this advice to the British government.194
The NIHRC interpreted its mandate for advice on a Bill of Rights for
Northern Ireland to be "ECHR-plus," given the clauses in the
agreement of which it had been asked to take account.195 These
clauses "invited"196 the Commission "to consult and to advise on the
scope for defining, in Westminster legislation, rights supplementary
to those in the European Convention on Human Rights, [and] to
reflect the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland."197 As the
Chief Commissioner of the NIHRC notes in his evidence to the Irish
Parliament in 2015, this provision is an "implicit recognition of those
rights and their enforcement in practice."198 As Murray et. al. argue in
their 2015 report, it is this section of the Agreement that provides a
prima facie case that the "baseline of the relationship between the law
of Northern Ireland and the ECHR should be maintained."199
The peace accord from 1998 has therefore "the agreement of
both governments in terms of an international Agreement, [which]
cannot be ignored; it has to be accepted."200 It is an agreement
between the Executive’s political parties (given that the subsequent St
Andrews Agreement included the DUP) and the British and Irish
governments, so all of these stakeholders are required to fulfill their

192. See Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland, Gr. Brit.-N. Ir., art. 2 (Apr. 10, 1998), 2114
U.N.T.S. 473 Article 2.
193. Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, supra note 10, § 6 (covering “Rights, Safeguards
and Equality of Opportunity.”).
194. A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: Advice to the Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland, supra note 13.
195. Murray et al., supra note 5, at 21.
196. Northern Ireland Peace Agreement (The Good Friday Agreement,), Gr. Brit.-N. Ir.,
Section 6, paragraph 4, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity, Oct. 4, 1998.
197. Id.
198. Les Allamby, Chief Comm’r, Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission Briefing
on the Proposal to Repeal the United Kingdom Human Rights Act 1998 and its Potential Effect
on the Good Friday Agreement, N. IR. HUM. RTS. COMM’N (June 3, 2015), http://www.
ihrec.ie/download/pdf/nihrc_oireachtas_briefing_good_friday_agreement_25_june_2015.pdf
at 3 (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
199. Murray et al., supra note 5, at 42.
200. Interview with Alban Maginness, MLA, SDLP, in Belfast (May 1, 2013).
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obligations as set out in this accord.201 Further under Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which the United
Kingdom is a party, the United Kingdom has the obligation to fulfill
its promises in good faith and in accordance with its subsequent
actions.202 Under this article, it is arguable that the UK government
has not fulfilled its promises to legislate. As part of its guarantee, in
the Joint Declaration of 2003, the UK government would have been
expected to set out its own legislative proposals with the receipt of the
NIHRC’s advice to the Secretary of State in 2008. However, in the
terms of the Vienna Convention, no "subsequent actions" have
followed its 2009 consultation on the NIHRC advice203 and a
continuing stalemate has been accentuated by the UK government’s
proposals on the repeal of the Human Rights Act.
As a bilateral interstate agreement, the United Kingdom
arguably owes obligations to the Republic of Ireland.204 In that
context, one possibility is international litigation at the International
Court of Justice ("ICJ").205 Both the United Kingdom and the Irish
have recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. It is
technically possible, therefore, for the Irish government to bring a
case against the UK government for breaching the Good
Friday/Belfast Agreement. However, there is an important caveat—a
caveat imposed by the Irish government itself, as it does not recognize
201. See id. “We will establish a forum on a Bill of Rights and convene its inaugural
meeting in December 2006.” See also Agreement at St Andrews, Gr. Brit.-N. Ir. (Oct. 13,
2006), ‘Human Rights, Equality, Victims and Other Issues’ Annex B,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136651/st_
andrews_agreement-2.pdf (last visited May 2, 2016).
202. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31:1, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.”). See also Agreement at St Andrews, supra note 201, at art. 31:2 (“The
context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text,
including its preamble and annexes . . .”), at art. 31:3 (“There shall be taken into account,
together with the context: (a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions.”).
203. For reports supporting this conclusion, see, e.g., Murray et al., supra note 5, at 23;
Gallagher et al., supra note 5, at 63-66.
204. See generally Murray et al, supra note 5, at 23. This report argues that as
international treaties owe duties to individuals as well as to states, the United Kingdom is in
violation of its commitments to the people of Northern Ireland.
205. Due to space constraint, this article focuses primarily on litigation as one possible
mechanism. For other options, see Gallagher et al., supra note 5, at 63-66; Murray et al., supra
note 5, at 27-58.

118

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40:1

compulsory jurisdiction if there are issues relating to Northern
Ireland.206
Another possibility is to lodge an interstate case using the special
procedure of Article 33 of the ECHR (brought by one member of the
Council of Europe against another) if the government proceeds with
its plans of repealing the Human Rights Act.207 Any Contracting Party
under the ECHR would be effectively fulfilling its obligations under
Article 46 (1) of the ECHR. If the United Kingdom were to proceed
with its plans to not comply with decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights, viewing them as advisory only, this would be a
violation of international law with the United Kingdom arguably
breaching its obligations to other Contracting Parties.208 While such a
decision would not be "taken lightly,"209 it is open to the Irish
government to consider taking such action if an "ECHR-minus"210
Bill of Rights prevails.211 In that context, the political stalemate on the
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights could potentially be shifted.
The second question raised earlier is whether the consent of the
devolved regions is required for the introduction of both a UK Bill of
Rights and Brexit under the Sewel Convention.212 The Sewel
206. This idea is borrowed from Professor Chris McCrudden’s presentation on “The
Constitutional Significance of the Human Rights Act in Northern Ireland” at a conference on
“The Impact of the Human Rights Act in Northern Ireland,” Belfast (Jan. 26, 2016), on file
with the author. See also Chris McCrudden & Gordon Anthony, Potential Impact of Repealing
the Human Rights Act on EU Law, Oral Evidence to the EU Justice Subcommittee (Jan. 26,
2016); EU Justice Sub-Committee, PARLIAMENT LIVE (Jan. 26, 2016), http://parliament
live.tv/Event/Index/1392eebe-aa68-4ad5-83b2-3aa2eca7440e.
207. European Convention on Human Rights art. 33 (Nov. 4, 1950). Article 33 states
“Any High Contracting Party may refer to the Court any alleged breach of the provisions of
the Convention and the Protocols thereto by another High Contracting Party.” See also Murray
et al., supra note 5, at 56-57 (providing further discussion on this option).
208. Gallagher et al., supra note 5, at 63-64.
209. Irish Government to Reopen the Case of the Hooded Men, IRISH IN BRITAIN,
http://www.irishinbritain.org/news-and-events/124/irish-government-to-reopen-the-case-of-the
-hooded-men (last visited Mar. 16, 2016).
210. Murray et al., supra note 5, at 21.
211. Id. Murray, O’Donoghue, and Warwick highlight the fact that the Irish Government
has re-opened a previous inter-state case (Ireland v. United Kingdom 2 Eur. H. R. Rep. EHRR
25 (1978)) shows its commitment to maintaining human rights standards.
212. This Convention is named after Lord Sewel, who stated during the debate on the
Scottish Bill 1998 that “we would expect a convention to be established that Westminster
would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters in Scotland without the consent
of the Scottish parliament.” See 592 Parl Deb HL (1998) col. 768-80021. Thereafter, this was
referred to as the Sewel Convention.
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Convention recognizes that the Westminster Parliament has the
ultimate authority to pass legislation on all matters, irrespective of
whether they are devolved/transferred or reserved/excepted. However,
the Westminster Parliament will not legislate on devolved/transferred
matters in the absence of an "agreement/legislative consent motion"
of the devolved legislature.213 The applicability of this Convention, as
far as repealing the Human Rights Act is concerned, hinges on
whether it is a devolved or a reserved matter. The UK government’s
position is unclear on this: "it is neither reserved nor devolved."214 To
quote Lord Blair of Boughton, "[i]t is like saying that you feel a little
bit pregnant; it is just not possible. It is either reserved or
devolved."215 To shed some clarity on this issue, the authors put
forward two schools of thought.216 Under a narrow reading of the
Sewel Convention, as the Human Rights Act is not a
devolved/transferred matter,217 any repeal of the Human Rights Act
arguably would not violate the Sewel Convention, as it would not be
213. The Sewel Convention is embodied in the September 2012 Memorandum of
Understanding (“MoU”) between the UK Government and the devolved administrations in
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. In the explanatory section, it states: “This paper,
superseding Command Paper Cm 5240 published in December 2001, comprises a series of
agreements between the UK Government and the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland setting out the principles which underlie relations between them. It is not
intended that these agreements should be legally binding.” DEVOLUTION MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM
GOVERNMENT, THE SCOTTISH MINISTERS, THE WELSH MINISTERS, AND THE NORTHERN
IRELAND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT BY COMMAND OF HER
MAJESTY AND PRESENTED TO THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND
ASSEMBLY AND LAID BEFORE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR WALES 3 (October 2013),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/316157/MoU_b
etween_the_UK_and_the_Devolved_Administrations.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2016). The
MoU describes the Sewel Convention in similar language: “The UK Government will proceed
in accordance with the convention that the UK Parliament would not normally legislate with
regard to devolved matters except with the agreement of the devolved legislature. The
devolved administrations will be responsible for seeking such agreement as may be required
for this purpose on an approach from the UK Government.” Id. at 8.
214. Michael Gove, House of Lords, Revised Transcript of Evidence Taken Before The
Select Committee on the European Union, Justice Sub-Committee Inquiry on the Potential
Impact on EU Law of Repealing the Human Rights Act, Evidence Session no. 8, Questions 7990 (Feb. 2, 2016).
215. Lord Blair of Boughton, House of Lords, The Select Committee on the European
Union Justice Sub-Committee Inquiry on Potential Impact on EU Law of Repealing the
Human Rights Act, Evidence Session No. 8, Questions 79 – 90 (Feb. 2, 2016).
216. This idea is borrowed from Chris McCrudden. See supra note 206 and
accompanying text.
217. Northern Ireland Act 1998, c. 47, § 7 (1) (b).
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legislating upon a Northern Ireland/devolved issue. However, under a
broader reading of the Convention, any repeal of the Human Rights
Act would trigger the Convention, as the UK parliament would be
legislating "with regard to devolved matters . . . which affects the
scope of the legal authority of a devolved legislature or a devolved
administration."218 This is due to the explicit wording of the Northern
Ireland Act, as it expressly requires the Northern Ireland Assembly
and Executive to observe and implement "obligations under the
Human Rights Convention,"219 and the devolved institutions are
expressly prohibited from diminishing the ECHR rights and
protections.220
If the UK Bill of Rights was to reduce the existing protections
provided under the ECHR (as in scenario two above), the Sewel
Convention would apply.221 Would such a consent motion be
forthcoming? This is hard to predict given the narrow vote in a recent
debate in the Northern Ireland Assembly on the repeal of the Human
Rights Act.222 The Assembly Members narrowly voted against
218. Alan Trench, Legislative Consent and the Sewel Convention, DEVOLUTION
MATTERS (June 2016), https://devolutionmatters.wordpress.com/the-sewel-convention/. For a
lively discussion on the differing views on this issue, see Iain Jamieson, The Repeal of the
Human Rights Act and the Sewel Convention in Scotland, SCOTTISH CONST. FUTURES F. (June
12, 2015), http://www.scottishconstitutionalfutures.org/OpinionandAnalysis/ViewBlogPost
/tabid/1767/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/5741/Iain-Jamieson-The-Repeal-of-the-HumanRights-Act-and-the-Sewel-Convention-in-Scoltand.aspx; see also Mark Elliot, HRA Watch:
Reform, Repeal, Replace? Could the Devolved Nations Block Repeal of the Human Rights Act
and the Enactment of a New Bill of Rights?, U.K. CONST. L. ASS’N (May 16, 2015),
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2015/05/16/hra-watch-reform-repeal-replace-mark-elliottcould-the-devolved-nations-block-repeal-of-the-human-rights-act-and-the-enactment-of-anew-bill-of-rights/.
219. Northern Ireland Act 1998, c. 47, sch. 2, ¶ 3..
220. Northern Ireland Act 1998, c. 47, § 24(1)(a). The same applies to Scotland and
Wales under the Scotland Act 1998, § 29(2)(d), § 57(2) and the Government of Wales Act
2006, c. 32, § 81(1).
221. Bates et al., supra note 5, at 10-14; Gallagher et al., supra note 5, at 6, 53;
Gormally, supra note 5; Murray et al., supra note 5, at 13-15; Colm O’Cinneide, Human
Rights, Devolution and the Constrained Authority of the Westminster Parliament, U.K. CONST.
L. BLOG (Mar. 4, 2013), http://ukconstitutionallaw.org.
222. 105 NIA Deb (2015) col. 2 1, http://www.theyworkforyou.com/ni/?id=2015-0601.6.1#g6.79. House of Lords EU Justice subcommittee on the Potential Impact of Repealing
the Human Rights Act on EU Law to the Parliamentary EU Justice Sub-Committee,
PARLIAMENT LIVE (Jan. 26, 2016), http://parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/1392eebe-aa68-4ad583b2-3aa2eca7440e (last visited Mar. 24 2016). In oral evidence by Professors McCrudden
and Anthony, they note that such consent would not be forthcoming. See McCrudden &
Anthony, supra note 206. This reflects the final conclusions of the House of Lords EU Justice
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repealing the Human Rights Act, with the two main Unionists parties
voting in favor.223 It is possible that the UK government could ignore
the Convention, as it is not legally enforceable,224 but it could be
entering into "unchartered constitutional territory."225 As a leading
constitutional lawyer states, "the justiciability of the Convention will
ultimately be decided by the UK Supreme Court."226 Until this matter
is agreed,227 several commentators agree that if the UK government
subcommittee’s report. See The House of Lords European Union Committee, The UK, the EU
and a British Bill of Rights, 12th Report of Session 2015-2016, May 9, 2016 (“The evidence
demonstrates that the Northern Ireland Assembly [is] unlikely to give consent to a Bill of
Rights which repealed the Human Rights Act.”). House of Lords EU Justice Subcommittee,
The UK, The EU, and a British Bill of Rights, 2015-16, HL 139, http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/139/139.pdf at 52 (last visited June.
6, 2016).
223. Gormally, supra note 5. Even if such a motion were to be introduced, this would
“almost certainly be met with a Petition of Concern and thereby fail to achieve the necessary
agreement.”
224. This is clearly stated in the MoU between the UK government and the devolved
regions: “It is not intended that these agreements should be legally binding.” DEVOLUTION
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE
UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT, THE SCOTTISH MINISTERS, THE WELSH MINISTERS, AND
THE NORTHERN IRELAND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT BY
COMMAND OF HER MAJESTY AND PRESENTED TO THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT AND THE
NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY AND LAID BEFORE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR WALES 3
(Oct. 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/316157/MoU_between_the_UK_and_the_Devolved_Administrations.pdf. However, it is
important to note that the Sewel Convention is both a Convention and a statute in Scotland.
This followed a recommendation by the Smith Commission. See THE SMITH COMMISSION,
REPORT OF THE SMITH COMMISSION FOR FURTHER DEVOLUTION OF POWERS TO THE
SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT 13 (Nov. 27, 2014) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/
28_11_14_smithcommission.pdf. This issue was also debated in the Scottish Parliament. See
The Sewel Convention, Scotland Bill, Clause 2 June 2015, Parl Deb HC (2015) c10815
(2015). The Scotland Act 2016 received royal assent on March 23, 2016. See also Scotland
Act 2016, § 2, for a specific reference to the Sewel Convention.
225. The House of Lords European Union Committee, The UK, the EU and a British Bill
of Rights, 12th Report of Session 2015-2016 42 (May 9, 2016), http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/139/139.pdf.
226. See id.; Michael Zander, Will It Ever Come to Pass? NEW L. J. 11, 12 (2015). The
issue of justiciability was also discussed in the House of Lord’s Select Committee on the
Constitution. House of Lords, Revised transcript of evidence taken before The Select
Committee on the European Union, Justice Sub-Committee Inquiry on the Potential Impact on
EU Law of Repealing the Human Rights Act, Evidence Session No. 8, supra note 159, at
Questions 79-90. During this debate, Mr. Gove acknowledged that an “attempt” could be made
by someone to bring a case before the courts, but he hoped that the courts would agree with the
Government’s intention and admitted that this would be a matter for the courts to decide.
227. Chris McCrudden uses what is referred to as the Partition Reference case in
Canada, Re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (1981) 1 S.C.R. 753, as an example
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were to impose what has been labeled "a major legislative
imposition"228 without the consent of the devolved administrations,
this unilateral action could be viewed as not only
"unconstitutional,"229 but such legislation would be "more difficult to
achieve politically."230 As the government itself has admitted:
. . . the devolution settlements not only acknowledge, but support
the idea that a blanket, “one-size-fits-all” approach is not always
appropriate for the diverse histories, needs, and priorities across
the UK. There have been and remain different levels of demand,
in different contexts, for devolution in England, Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland. Devolution is asymmetric in nature
precisely to reflect and support the variations of all these
factors.231

To proceed with what has been described as an "unpalatable"232
course of action would undermine and be "at variance with the
devolution settlement[s],"233 and potentially risking undermining the
relationship between the constituent parts of the United Kingdom.234
The Joint Committee on Human Rights also recognizes the
importance of giving the devolved institutions a "full opportunity to
contribute" on this issue.235 Likewise, the Council of Europe
where the justiciability of a convention was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada. See
McCrudden, supra note 206; see also House of Lords’ European Union Committee ‘12th
Report of Session 2015–16’ HL Paper 139, May 9, 2016; Peter C. Oliver Constitutional
Conventions in the Canadian Courts, UK CONST. L. ASS’N (Nov. 4, 2011), https://
ukconstitutionallaw.org/2011/11/04/peter-c-oliver-constitutional-conventions-in-the-canadiancourts/.
228. Murray et al. supra note 5.
229. Id.
230. Bates et al., supra note 5, at 12.
231. Government Response to the House of Commons Political and Constitutional
Reform Committee Fourth Report of Session 2012-13: Do We Need a Constitutional
Convention for the UK (2013), Cm. 8749, at 7.
232. Gallagher et al, supra note 5, at 54.
233. Murray et al., supra note 5, at 15.
234. Id.
235. Letter from the Chair of the Joint Comm’n. on Human Rights to Mitchell
McLaughlin, former Speaker of the N. Ir. Assembly (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.parliament.
uk/documents/joint-committees/human-rights/BoR_purdah_letter_(NI).pdf (last visited Apr. 6,
2016). The Speaker of the Northern Ireland Assembly replied to this letter on February 29,
2016 stating that he is “glad” the Committee is seeking to ensure the devolved regions play an
important role in this debate and highlighted the division within the Northern Ireland
Assembly on repealing the Human Rights Act citing the assembly debate on June 1, 2015.
Letter from Mitchel McLaughlin to Rt Hon Harriet Harman MP/Chair of the Joint Comm’n.
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Commissioner for Human Rights has encouraged more consultation
with the devolved regions.236 In contrast, the former Lord Chancellor
was reluctant to "pronounce definitively"237 on this matter as he
wanted to wait and see "what is in any given Bill in order to be
absolutely certain as to whether a legislative consent Motion might be
required in any of the devolved legislatures."238 Arguably, this means
that the government’s position as to whether a legislative consent
motion is necessary is "an open question."239
The British government’s position on whether consent from the
Northern Ireland Assembly (and the other devolved assemblies) is
needed to leave the European Union following Brexit is also an open
question. As far as the British government is concerned, although they
will be consulting and working with the Northern Ireland Executive
and the Scottish government, "ultimately it is parliament’s decision
whether we [the government] repeal the 1972 European Communities
Act or whether we don’t."240 While we do not disagree with one of the
most fundamental doctrines underpinning UK constitutional law as
EU law is entrenched in the devolution settlement,241 the House of
Lords report on the process of withdrawing from the European Union
states it "has no reason"242 to believe that legislative consent is not
needed from all of the devolved assemblies. Would such consent be
forthcoming? One source has estimated that about one-third of the

on Human Rights (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/
human-rights/Letter_from_Mitchel_Mclaughlin_290216.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2016).
236. The Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights, Nils Muižnieks, visited
the United Kingdom on January 22, 2016. Following this visit, he published a speech. See
Muižnieks supra note 187.
237. House of Lords, Revised transcript of evidence taken before The Select Committee
on the Constitution, Oral Evidence with the Rt. Hon. Michael Gove MP, former Lord
Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, Evidence Session No. 1, Questions 1-12 (Dec. 2,
2015).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. EU referendum: Theresa Villiers Says Parliament is Sovereign, BBC NEWS (June
26, 2016), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-36633939. The European
Communities Act is the piece of legislation that allowed the United Kingdom to join the then
European Economic Community.
241. Northern Ireland Act 1998 § 6(2)(d).
242. HM GOVERNMENT, THE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWING FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION
(Feb. 2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/504216/The_process_for_withdrawing_from_the_EU_print_ready.pdf (last visited Aug. 8,
2016).
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Assembly’s members support Brexit (DUP, TUV, and some from the
UUP, although the leader of the UUP voted to remain, and possibly
People Before Profit).243 The other parties (Sinn Féin, Alliance,
SDLP, and the Green Party) are pro-Remain.244 Indeed, all of the proRemain parties are part of a current legal challenge arguing that if the
prime minister, Theresa May, fails to address legal obligations
relating to Northern Ireland and to the peace process before the legal
mechanism to withdraw from the European Union is triggered,245 the
political parties alongside human rights activists will launch a legal
case.246 One of the issues raised by the legal team representing the
cross-community of coalition of politicians and human rights activists
is the need for a legislative consent motion to be carried out by the
Assembly.
If such legislative consent is not forthcoming, could the British
government proceed with Brexit even though the democratic will of
the Northern Ireland electorate voted to remain within the European
Union? As stated earlier, under the doctrine of parliamentary
constitutionally, the UK parliament has the authority to do so. As one
Northern Ireland politician states:
. . . ultimately there [is] nothing the regional parliaments could do
. . . We would have the opportunity to make decisions over
specific EU rules and laws that actually apply in Northern Ireland
. . . However, parliament remains with primacy, it can take back

243. Jonathan Tonge, Brexit: Leaving May Need Consent of Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland, IRISH TIMES (June 27, 2016), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/
world/uk/brexit-leaving-may-need-consent-of-scotland-wales-and-northern-ireland-1.2700810.
244. Sinn Féin, Alliance, SDLP and the Green Party all campaigned for a remain vote.
See DUP Confirms It Will Campaign for Brexit in Leave/Remain Referendum, BELFAST
TELEGRAPH (Feb. 20, 2016), http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/dupconfirms-it-will-campaign-for-brexit-in-leaveremain-referendum-34470806.html.
245. Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union to the European Council allows a
member state to withdraw from the European Union. This allows for a two-year negotiation
period between the United Kingdom and the rest of the EU member states. See HOUSE OF
COMMONS LIBRARY, LEAVING THE EU, 9-14 (July 1, 2013), http://researchbriefings.files.
parliament.uk/documents/RP13-42/RP13-42.pdf.
246. Steven McCaffery, Brexit Set to Face Legal Challenge in Northern Ireland, DETAIL
(July 25, 2016), http://www.thedetail.tv/articles/brexit-set-to-face-legal-challenge-in-northernireland. There are also other legal cases pending in London. See Mishcon de Reya, Article 50
Process on Brexit Faces Legal Challenges to Ensure Parliamentary Involvement, MISHCON DE
REYA LLP (July 3, 2016), http://www.mishcon.com/news/firm_news/article_50_process_
on_brexit_faces_legal_challenge_to_ensure_parliamentary_involvement_07_2016.
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power from Holyrood, it can take back power from the assembly,
so let’s not kid ourselves.247

On a constitutional level, the authors agree with this statement.
However, as EU law is part of the devolution settlement, such an
approach would be politically hazardous, as it would greatly
undermine the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement. One of the key
provisions of the Agreement is the right of citizenship that entitles
anyone born in Northern Ireland to have dual citizenship (meaning
Irish or British or both). As Fintan O’Toole, the Irish Times journalist
asks, "[w]hat does that mean in the new dispensation? Can someone
be both an EU citizen and not an EU citizen?"248 While Westminster
can constitutionally assert its right to withdraw Northern Ireland and
Scotland from the European Union, it ignores "the reality that
Westminster is no longer politically capable of enforcing that
right."249
While a legislative consent motion for Brexit and for repealing
the Human Rights Act remains an open question, this is in stark
contrast to the British government’s position on a Northern Ireland
Bill of Rights, where legislative consent amongst the Northern Ireland
political parties is demanded before the same government will
introduce legislation at Westminster:
. . . a legislative consent motion must be passed by the Assembly
in circumstances where the government brings forward any
legislation at Westminster such as a Bill of Rights which will
have a significant impact on devolved policy. … The British
government is happy to move, but there is no point in moving
until we have achieved some sort of consensus which is very
much lacking at the moment.250

247. EU referendum: Theresa Villiers Says Parliament is Sovereign, supra note 240.
248. Fintan O’Toole, The English Have Placed a Bomb Under the Irish Peace Process,
THE GUARDIAN (June 24, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/24/
northern-irish-peace-sacrificed-english-nationalism.
249. Jo Murkens, Westminster Must Choose Between Leaving the EU and Retaining the
UK, DEMOCRATIC AUDIT UK (July 6, 2016), http://www.democraticaudit.com/?p=23214.
250. Owen Paterson, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, quoted in Mark Hennessy,
Stormont Agreement Needed for Rights Bill, IRISH TIMES (Nov. 23, 2010); see also Theresa
Villiers, former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Westminster Hall (2013) in 16 Parl
Deb WH (6th ser.) (2013) col. 197 (UK); Letter from Owen Patterson, Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland (2010–12) to the leaders of the Northern Ireland Political Parties, received by
the Northern Ireland Assembly (Sept. 22, 2011) (on file with the authors).
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However, a precedent exists: in 2007, the British government
intervened at the regional level because the Northern Ireland
Assembly was unable to reach consensus on the transposition of the
EU Gender Directive on Goods and Services (2004/113/EC). This
Directive implements the principle of equal treatment between men
and women in the access to and supply of goods and services. Due to
lack of cross-party agreement on the issue of transgender in the
regulations,251 when consent was not forthcoming, the British
government took forward the legislation for Northern Ireland.252
Under section 26 of the Northern Ireland Act of 1998, the UK
government has the power to direct action (including legislation) to be
taken by a Northern Ireland Minister in order to fulfill international
obligations.253 However, these powers have not been exercised in
relation to the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights. Instead, the
government has invented a requirement of cross-party consensus254 to
implement the international obligation of the Northern Ireland Bill of
Rights. As the British government is well aware, there is no such
consensus and, as such, the political stalemate continues. The next
section addresses how this political stalemate could potentially be
shifted.

251. The then First Minister opposed introducing legislation on the basis that he was “not
agreeable” due to “the explicit inclusion of reference to transgender or gender reassignment in
the regulations.” As the Committee on the Administration of Justice (“CAJ”) points out,
“whilst gender reassignment is a different matter to sexual orientation, a DUP colleague on the
Committee, Stephen Moutray, stated their concern was that ‘Bible-believing Christians would
be put in a position where they could have to take part in ceremonies at gay weddings, or if
they were a guesthouse owner, they would have to give a double room to two gay men.’”
CAJ’s Submission to the Department of Culture, Arts, and Leisure Consultation on Tograi
Faoi Choinne Bille Gaeilgre (Proposals for an Irish Language Bill), COMM. ADMIN. JUSTICE
(May 2015), http://www.caj.org.uk/files/2015/05/08/S443_CAJs_submission_to_DCAL_
consultation_on_Irish_Language_Bill_May_2015.pdf.
252. The authors are grateful to Daniel Holder, Deputy Director of the CAJ, for bringing
this example to our attention.
253. Northern Ireland Act 1998 § 26(2) (“If the Secretary of State considers that any
action capable of being taken by a Minister or Northern Ireland department is required for the
purpose of giving effect to any international obligations, of safeguarding the interests of
defence or national security or of protecting public safety or public order, he may by order
direct that the action shall be taken.”).
254. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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VI. THE WAY FORWARD
We conclude that an agreed framework between the
governments would provide an opportunity to ascertain the extent of
agreement and/or disagreement on the proposals put forward by the
NIHRC and the main political parties. In establishing a process for
discussions between the parties, as part of this framework, the parties
should be asked to address the question as to what they understand to
be the role of a Bill of Rights. Answers to such questions should be
used as the basis for banking agreement and building consensus. The
parties should be encouraged to design a set of agreed principles from
which they can agree on the rights appropriate to the particular
circumstances of Northern Ireland using the NIHRC’s advice (and
any further advice) as a tool to assist with their decision making.
What might work best could be a combination of elements: a
framework that clearly identifies the objective and how it will be
achieved; commitment from the British and Irish governments to
assist the process; and a variety of useful tools designed to help
political parties carry out their discussions effectively. In addition, a
high-level third party champion could help facilitate the discourse.
Dialogue is important to gauge what the parties wish to achieve in
terms of outcomes. Some consideration should be given to identify
not only a respected third party for the process but also to identify a
location where dedicated discussions can take place away from the
glare of publicity and media speculation.
In this regard, the model involved in taking forward police
reform following the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement could be used
as an exemplar given that a series of roundtable events took place in
and out of Northern Ireland providing neutral and safe spaces for
parties to discuss a range of options. It is critical that in any future
process, the political parties benefit from the experience of
independent human rights experts and those with expertise in scoping
out or drafting Bills of Rights. The process has to also respect the
United Kingdom’s obligations under international law.255 This need
was evidenced in our empirical findings where there were a number
255. See Anne Smith, The Drafting Process of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, PUB.
L. 526 (2004); Anne Smith, Bills of Rights as Process: The Canadian Experience, 3:4 INT’L J.
OF L. IN CONTEXT 343 (2008); Anne Smith, Constitutionalising Equality: The South African
Experience, 9:4 INT’L J. DISCRIMINATION & L. 201 (2008).
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of misunderstandings amongst some political parties on what a Bill of
Rights can and cannot deliver.
The authors have already embarked on a series of roundtable
discussions on a Bill of Rights; the first was in Belfast on December
14, 2015. The British and Irish governments were represented, as
were the main political parties and representatives from the NIHRC
and civil society.256 The feedback was positive and the importance of
holding such an event was highlighted where the parties could be
provided with the space to work out their differences and ascertain a
level of common ground.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that the local political actors will not take the lead on
the outstanding issue of a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights because the
requisite political will is lacking and there is insufficient technical and
legal capacity to do so.257 It is also evident that the UK government’s
plan to replace the Human Rights Act with a British Bill of Rights,
alongside the decision to leave the European Union, has created an
extra layer of complexity in the steps needed to progress a Northern
Ireland Bill of Rights. In light of these recent political developments,
a "double argument" exists258 for Northern Ireland to have its own
Bill of Rights incorporating the ECHR and the EU-related rights.
Indeed, as human rights are devolved, the Northern Ireland Assembly
(or any of the devolved legislatures) could replace the Human Rights
Act with another Act with the same level of rights protection as exists
under the ECHR and the European Union. However, two important
points must be made. First, the wording of the Good Friday/Belfast
Agreement specifically stipulates that the rights in a Bill of Rights are
to be "supplementary to those in the European Convention on Human

256. There were representatives from the Alliance Party, SDLP, Sinn Féin, UUP, and the
DUP. The Green Party sent their apologies, the TUV, PUP, and NI21 did not respond to the
invite.
257. Participants at the roundtable event in Belfast highlighted the important role of
politics and political will and leadership progressing a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. See
Feedback From the Roundtable Event on Where Next for a Bill of Rights for Northern
Ireland?, Belfast (Dec. 15, 2015) (on file with authors).
258. Alban Maginness, Roundtable Discussion on Where Next for a Bill of Rights for
Northern Ireland?, Belfast (Dec. 14, 2015) (on file with authors).
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Rights."259 The Human Rights Act was to be a "place-holder
measure"260 until Northern Ireland had its own Bill of Rights. Second,
a cautionary note is needed in relation to passing legislation perceived
to be contentious, since the use of the petition of concern can act as a
veto and block further progress in the Northern Ireland Assembly.
The UK government pledges its "strong support for the political
institutions established over the past two decades as a result of the
various Agreements" in the same manifesto in which it set out the
repeal of the Human Rights Act and the referendum on the European
Union.261 As Fintan O’Toole notes, "Northern Ireland is not
Lincolnshire or Somerset. It is a distinct and unique political entity,
recognised as such by an international treaty registered with the
United Nations: the Belfast Agreement of 1998."262 In line with this
peace accord, the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights is, and should
continue to be seen as, a separate process, independent of and
unfettered by the UK debate about a British Bill of Rights. As noted
earlier, this was one of the findings of the UK Bill of Rights
Commission’s report, and this argument has been endorsed at the
international level, with several UN bodies calling on the British
government to "expedite the enactment"263 of a Northern Ireland Bill
of Rights "without delay."264 This article argues that the time has
arrived for the UK government to uphold its international legal
obligations or be brought to task for not doing so. Since the current
situation has raised a range of issues in relation to a Bill of Rights for
Northern Ireland, that is where the silver lining may yet be found.

259. The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, supra note 10, at ¶ 4, 16-17 (covering
“Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity”).
260. Murray et al. supra note 5.
261. CONSERVATIVE PARTY MANIFESTO, supra note 156.
262. Fintan O’Toole, Belfast Agreement is a Threat to the New English Nationalism,
IRISH TIMES (July 5, 2016), http://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/fintan-o-toole-belfastagreement-is-a-threat-to-the-new-english-nationalism-1.2710209.
263. UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations
on the UK, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GBR/CO/6 (June 24, 2016); UN Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations on the UK, ¶¶ 9-10, U.N. Doc
CERD/C/GBR/CO/21-23 (Aug. 26, 2016).
264. UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations on the UK, ¶
7, U.N. Doc. E/C.CRC/C/GBR/CO/5 (June 3 2016).
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